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Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law 
Michael D. Murray1 
Abstract 
This article introduces twenty-first century law and economics as a school of 
contemporary legal rhetoric—a rhetorical lens to test and improve general legal 
discourse in areas beyond the economic analysis of law.  The recognition that the 
rhetoric of law and economics is persuasive—and not just to legal economists—
reveals the enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal discourse 
through which to examine the structure and design of the discourse and as a source 
of topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the 
discourse. 
This article presents my conception of the four rhetorical canons of law and 
economics: 
 Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and 
demonstration; 
 The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs;  
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 The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and  
 Rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral social 
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science. 
 
The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive implications for 
general legal discourse as topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style. I 
examine each of the rhetorical canons and explain how each can be used to create 
meaning, inspire imagination, and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse in 
every area of law. 
Introduction 
 Why is law and economics persuasive?  Can the modes of persuasion of law 
and economics be used more generally in legal discourse outside the realm of 
economic analysis of law? 
This article introduces law and economics as a school of contemporary legal 
rhetoric.  My goal here is not to critique the contemporary law and economics2 
analysis of law nor to examine the benefits or costs of the application of economic 
                                                 
2 I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first century law and economics 
that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic approaches to the study and analysis of law.  This 
shall be distinguished from “new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in the 1960’s 
and which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the analysis of law.  New or 
neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as “traditional” or “conventional” law and 
economics.  See generally Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) [Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law]; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of 
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 
83, 138 (2004) [Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism 
and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 (1996); Joshua D. Wright, 
Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470, 470-72 (2007). 
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analysis in shaping law and social policy.3  Instead, I seek to examine law and 
economics as a rhetorical perspective in law.   
Rhetoric and law and economics do not often share the same paragraph in 
academic legal writing let alone the same article title,4 but a central focus of the 
discipline of law and economics is the study of human nature and human behavior5 
in order to predict what incentives can be communicated to humans that will 
motivate them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common goal of 
rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion.  The advocates of the 
economic analysis of law must persuade their own cohorts of the truth of their 
discoveries, and use the rhetoric of their discipline to do so, and also seek to 
communicate the lessons of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal 
community, and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider 
audience.  That law and economics is persuasive beyond the confirmed members of 
the discipline is supported by modern history:  critics and supporters alike agree 
                                                 
3 Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained through contemporary 
economic analysis of law. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008) 
[Cooter & Ulen]. 
 
4 An exception being, Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
752 (1988) [McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics], a very useful discussion to which I will refer 
below. 
 
5 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [Korobkin & Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral theory, and therein lies its true 
power."); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) [Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler] (“law and economics 
analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior”). 
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that law and economics has established itself as the dominant and most influential 
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.6   
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is persuasive—and not 
just to legal economists—reveals the enormous potential of law and economics as a 
lens on legal discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the 
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and arrangement and tropes 
of style in the content of the discourse.  The topoi and tropes of law and economics 
inspire inventive thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and 
the audience.  For many members of the legal writing discourse community—
judges, practitioners, government agencies, and academics—the modes of 
persuasion of law and economics can provide a critical perspective to construct 
meaning and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content, 
arrangement, and style.  As such, law and economics rhetoric can join the other 
schools of contemporary rhetoric7—modern argument theory,8 writing as a process 
                                                 
6 Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that the movement has become the most 
dominant method of legal analysis among legal scholars in at least the last fifty years.  See, e.g., Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142-43 (2003) [Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situation] (“The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the law 
schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law 
and economics [is] undeniable, . . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal 
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy and in the judiciary . . . 
[making it] the most important development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century.”) (inner 
citations omitted); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xix ("[Law and economics is] the 
foremost interdisciplinary field of legal studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1835, 1836 & n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in legal analysis, 
including law and literature). 
 
7 Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary Rhetoric, in 
THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B. 
Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990) [Kinneavy, Contemporary Rhetoric]; John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery, 
Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, 
PRACTICE (John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia 
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theory,9 and discourse community theory10— as a lens through which to examine 
and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse. 
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique combination of modes 
of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi11 and tropes12 to construct meaning and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990); Peter Goodrich, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold, 
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION: THE FIRST FIFTY 
YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959).  See also sources cited in nn.8-10, infra. 
 
8 See, e.g., Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 75, 
80-81 (2009) [Stanchi, Persuasion]; Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An 
Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 129, 139 (2006) [Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Linda 
L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court 
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007) (the corporate metaphor 
in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How 
the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 
169 (2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); Jerome Bruner & 
Anthony Amsterdam, MINDING THE LAW, chs. 2-3, 6-7 (2002); Frans H. Van Eemeren et al., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Stephen Toulmin et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d 
ed. 1984); Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969). 
 
9 See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n. 8, at 139; Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The 
Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEG. WRITING 57 (2000); Linda L. Berger, Applying 
New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. 
LEG. EDUC. 155 (1999); Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law 
Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say 
What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Elizabeth 
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. 
REV. 163 (1993); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986). 
 
10 See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n. 8, at 139; Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, 
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of 
Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); Brook K. 
Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills 
Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal 
Classroom, 34 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How 
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. 
REV. 7 (1998); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. 
L. REV. 35 (1994); Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and 
Development, 1 LEG. WRITING 1 (1991). 
 
11 In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = “place”) are the “topics” or 
“subjects” of argument that can be made in various situations.  Topoi are developed in the process of 
inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the 
type of argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio [Latin] or taxis 
[Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement” or “organization” or “disposition” of 
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to inform and persuade its audiences:  the priority of mathematical and scientific 
methods of analysis and demonstration, the characterization of legal phenomena as 
incentives and costs, the rhetorical economic concept of efficiency, and the lessons of 
rational choice theory as corrected by the empirical studies of behavioral social 
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.  My examination of contemporary law 
and economics as a rhetorical perspective requires the discussion of the following 
theses in parts I, II, and III of this article:  
• Part I — Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses its own 
rhetoric to persuade the members of the law and economics discourse 
community as well as the legal community as a whole.   
 
• Part II— Law and economics uses a unique combination of modes of 
persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropes—the rhetorical canons of law and 
economics—which are:  
 
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and demonstration; 
 
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs,  
 
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and  
                                                                                                                                                             
the contents of the argument.  See Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, CLASSICAL RHETORIC 
FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 17, 20, 89-91 (4th ed. 1999) [Corbett & Connors]; Gabriele Knappe, 
Classical Rhetoric in Anglo-Saxon England, 27 Anglo-Saxon England 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998).  
 
12 Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio;  Greek lexis) which pertains 
to the composition and wording of the discourse, including grammar, word choice, and figures of 
speech. See generally Smith, Rhetoric Theory, at 129, 133-34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in 
classical rhetoric); Corbett and Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra n.11, at 25-26.  
Figures of speech were divided into tropes (creative variations on the meanings of words) and 
schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of words).  Linda L. Berger, Studying 
and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 L. Writing (J.L.W.I.) 3, 51 & n.179 (2010) 
[Berger, Law as Rhetoric].  Professors Berger, Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified 
tropes as metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word in 
two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have different meanings); 
periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper name or of a proper name for a quality 
associated with the name); personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); 
rhetorical question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox.  Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 
51 & n.179; Corbett and Connors, supra, n.11, at 395-409.  See also Michael R. Smith, ADVANCED 
LEGAL WRITING 199-248 (metaphors), 328-40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [Smith, Advanced Legal 
Writing]. 
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o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern behavioral social 
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science. 
 
• Part III—The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive 
implications for legal discourse as topoi of invention and arrangement and 
tropes of style. 
 
 
 I. The Rhetorical Nature of Law and Economics 
 
 A. Law and Economics is inherently rhetorical  
 
 Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry and study, uses 
rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions, models, paradigms, assertions, and 
predictions.13  To understand the assertion represented by the sub-heading of this 
section—law and economics is inherently rhetorical—one must understand the 
nature of rhetoric:  Rhetoric is the “discovery and transmission of insight and 
knowledge.”14 Rhetoric is the discipline that examines “ways of winning others over 
to our views, and of justifying those views to ourselves as well as others, when the 
                                                 
13 See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 760; Wayne C. Booth, THE RHETORIC 
OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION xii (2004) [Booth, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric] 
("[W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything; ‘the rhetoric of philosophy,’ ‘the 
rhetoric of sociology,’ ‘the rhetoric of religion,’ even ‘the rhetoric of science.’ Though these rhetorics 
are not all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields depend on rhetoric in their 
arguments.  Most of them are in fact grappling with rhetorical issues, as they debate their 
professional claims.") (emphasis in original). 
 
14 Francis J. Mootz, III, Law In Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and The 
Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 317 (1999) (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The 
Expressive Power of Language, 107 PUBS. MOD. LANG. ASS'N AM. 348 (1992) [Gadamer, Expressive 
Power of Language]).  See also James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of 
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 695 (1985) [White, Law as Rhetoric] (“Like law, 
rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always 
starts in a particular culture and among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing 
others in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and 
speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials.”). 
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question of how things in the world ought to work is contested or contestable.”15 
“Rhetoric is primarily a verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic art that is both 
philosophical and practical and gives rise to potentially active texts.”16  Much of the 
scholarly attention within the discipline of rhetoric has been directed to effective 
communication with a particular focus on techniques for persuasive communication 
and argumentation; thus, many familiar definitions of rhetoric revolve around 
persuasion in discourse.17   
In this article, I am referring to the academic study of rhetoric, both in its 
classical18 and contemporary19 forms.  Rhetoric as the study of persuasion and 
                                                 
15 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, MINDING THE LAW 14 (2002).  See also White, Law as 
Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 684 (rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the community and the 
culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of the Practice of Law, February 14, 2002 
Roundtable Discussion, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2002) [White, Theology of Law] (“[T]he 
minute we begin to think and talk about anything at all we live in the world of language, a world of 
contingent resources for thought and speech, and rhetoric is a perfectly good term for how we do 
that.”). 
 
16 William A. Covino & David A. Joliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, 
BOUNDARIES 5 (1995). 
 
17 See, e.g., Aristotle, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W. Rhys Roberts transl. 1965) [Aristotle, The 
Rhetoric], available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/Rhetoric/ (last accessed Nov. 22, 2010) 
(Lee Honeycutt ed.) (“Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of persuasion.”); Aristotle, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 1355B 
(George A. Kennedy transl. 1991); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 n.14 (1990) [Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial] (“By ‘rhetoric,’ I mean the 
discipline . . . in which the objects of formal study are the conventions of discourse and argument.”); 
Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS 
AND PERSUASION 9 (2009) [Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers] (“[R]hetoric here refers to 
the art of persuasion through eloquent, inventive, and strategically organized discourse, both oral 
and written.”); John J. Makay, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE: COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND ATTITUDES 
9 (3d ed. 1984) [Makay, Speaking With an Audience] (“Rhetoric is defined ‘as the process of human 
communication in which a speaker sorts, selects, and sends symbols for the specific purpose of 
evoking a precise response’ from an audience.”). 
 
18 “Classical rhetoric” was begun in the fifth century B.C.E. and continued on and perfected over the 
course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.  See 
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 15-16, 18-19.  Even after this reign as the defining study of public 
discourse in classical times, the scholarship and teachings of classical rhetoric were followed as the 
dominant discipline for developing legal arguments until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 
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See id. at 2, 15.  The origin of classical rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse 
and argumentation is traced to Corax of Syracuse. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical 
Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615 (1999) [Frost, Lost Heritage]. The 
early tenets of the discipline were critiqued by Socrates and by Socrates’ student, Plato, see infra 
n.20, and subsequently they were refined by Plato’s student, Aristotle. See John H. Mackin, 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6-7, 17-18, 26 (1969). The most important writings 
of classical rhetoric are those of Aristotle, Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.17, Cicero, Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell transl., 1949); Marcus Tullius Cicero, DE ORATORE 
(E.W. Sutton transl., 1942), and Quintilian, 1 Marius Fabius Quintilian, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273 
(H.E. Butler transl., 1954), which together define the canons of the discipline that serve as a 
rhetorical lens on legal discourse. 
 
19 The contemporary period of rhetoric begins in the Twentieth Century.  Major movements in 
thought have broadened the study of rhetoric to include all aspects of communication, Robbins-
Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 61, including linguistics, ethics and persuasion, 
practical reasoning, human motivation, composition theories, cognitive studies, and socio-epistemic 
studies. Id. at 61-82.  See, e.g., I.A. Richards, The PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC (1936) (language and 
meaning); C. K. Ogden & I.A. Richards, THE MEANING OF MEANING (1972) (language and meaning); 
Roland Barthes, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1968) (language as 
symbols); Umberto Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976) (language as symbols); Lloyd F. Bitzer, The 
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 6-8, 389-92 (1968) [Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation] (the 
impact of situation); Kenneth Burke, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1969) [Burke, Grammar of Motives] 
(impact of culture); Kenneth Burke, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950) [Burke, Rhetoric of Motives] 
(impact of culture); Marshall McLuhan, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1996) 
(modern media studies); Richard M. Weaver, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (ethics).  Over time, 
the cognitive rhetoric group divided into the process theory cognitivists, who believe that the study of 
rhetoric should focus on the process of writing, a recursive rather than linear creative process, that 
teaches the writer how to reason and persuade and improve their communication by examining each 
stage of the writing process, see Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 79, and 
the discourse community cognitivists, who believe the study of rhetoric is a study of the writer’s 
assimilation into and acceptance of the tenets, vocabulary, and expectations of a discourse 
community, such as the legal writing discourse community.  See, e.g., Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for 
Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 80.  The socio-epistemic group combines social theories of community 
with epistemological theories of learning to form a theory of communication that considers the 
interaction of speaker, subject matter, and audience. See id. at 81.  
 The common thread among these the schools of thought in the developing discipline of 
contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking on the nature of knowledge and truth. Kristen K. 
Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal 
and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 108, 123 (2006) [Robbins, Philosophy v. 
Rhetoric].  Beginning in the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman asserted that truth is 
relative. Id.  See, e.g., Stephen E. Toulmin, USES OF ARGUMENT (updated ed. 2003) [Toulmin, Uses of 
Argument]; Chaim Perelman, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (William Kluback trans., 1982) [Perelman, 
Realm of Rhetoric]; Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8.  Toulmin argued that people in 
everyday life do not use Aristotelian logic to establish conclusive proof, but "informal logic" to reason 
and to acquire knowledge. Toulmin, supra n.8, at 94-134.  The knowledge acquired and the 
arguments made are only probable, not absolute. Id.  Like Toulmin, Perelman argued that appeals to 
reason lead only to probable truths:  “the appeal to reason must be identified not as an appeal to a 
single truth but instead as an appeal for the adherence of an audience. . . .” Chaim Perelman, THE 
NEW RHETORIC: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING, GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234-52 (1970) [Perelman, 
The New Rhetoric] (as reprinted in James L. Golden et al., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 
234-52 (6th ed. 1997)). From these beginnings, three contemporary theories of rhetoric arose to focus 
on the construction of meaning, the creation of arguments, and the processes that allow the creation 
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argument has a noble and classical tradition, but the discipline has had difficulty 
shaking off a common but enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources: Socrates 
and Plato described the early study and practice of rhetoric by the ancient Greek 
Sophists as the art of flattery and trickery,20 and throughout the ages the slur has 
stuck.  I emphasize that this slur is not the subject of my study here.  Rhetoric, the 
academic discipline, is not the study of hollow speech, not puffery designed to prop 
up specious assertions, not hyperbole employed to distract an audience from the 
truths or falsities of the speakers’ position.21  In short, it is nothing like the meaning 
of the commonplace phrase, “mere rhetoric.”22 I am not examining law and 
economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a discipline with a well-
developed system of argumentation and persuasion that has lessons for legal 
discourse beyond the realm of economic analysis of law. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of meaning and argumentation. See Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 
J. LEGAL ED. 108, 118-21 (1993).  These are:  Modern Argument Theory, Writing as a Process Theory, 
and the Theory of Discourse Communities. See Michael Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139. 
 
20 Socrates did not devote his time to the publication of works, so we rely on Plato whose writings 
purport to represent Socrates’ criticisms of rhetoric in such famous dialogues as Plato, PHAEDRUS, 
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010), Plato, 
GORGIAS, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/15_gorgias.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 
2010), and Plato, PHAEDO, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/14_phaedo.htm (last 
accessed Dec. 27, 2010). 
 
21 See, e.g., Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 COLL. COMP. & 
COM. 139, 139 (1963) [Booth, The Rhetorical Stance]; Wayne C. Booth, The Idea of a University as 
Seen by a Rhetorician, 1987 Ryerson Lecture, University of Chicago, available at 
http://home.uchicago.edu/ ~ahkissel/booth/booth.htm (last accessed Nov. 23, 2010) [Booth, Idea of a 
University]; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3-4 (1982). 
 
22 See Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal 
Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUIN. L. REV. 813, 817, 829 (2003); Booth, The Rhetorical 
Stance, supra n.21, at 139; Booth, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, supra n.13, at vii, x, 6-7. 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 11 of 83 
 
 B. Excerpts from the History of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics 
 The discipline of economics is rhetorical,23 and the discipline of law and 
economics is rhetorical, too.24  Adam Smith, the honorary father of economics, 
apparently understood the rhetorical imperatives of economics and the law when, in 
his Lectures on Jurisprudence concerning principle in the human mind and the 
division of labor, he commented on the topic of exchanges and self interest: “The 
offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is 
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so for it is in his 
interest. . . . Men always endevour {sic} to persuade others to be of their opinion 
even when the matter is of no consequence to them. . . . And in this manner every 
one is practicing oratory on others thro {sic} the whole of his life.”25  Robert L. 
Heilbroner interprets Smith to mean that “the basis for economic relationships lies 
not in a disinterested calculation of advantages, but in the ‘faculties of reason and 
speech’ that underlie the capacity for persuasion.”26 
                                                 
 
23 See Deirdre N. McCloskey, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS xix-xx, 5 (2d ed. 1998) [McCloskey, 
Rhetoric of Economics] [Note that the author, Donald N. McCloskey, became Deirdre N. McCloskey; 
the two names refer to the same author, but in my citations I will use the name or names used at the 
time of publication of the works cited here]; Arjo Klamer & Donald N. McCloskey, Economics in the 
Human Conversation, in Arjo Klamer, Donald N. McCloskey & Robert M. Solow, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 3-4, 11 (1988); see generally Donald N. McCloskey & 
Deirdre N. McCloskey, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 38-52 (1994). 
 
24 McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 760; 
 
25 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, as quoted in Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and 
Idealogy, in Arjo Klamer, Donald N. McCloskey & Robert M. Solow, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ECONOMIC RHETORIC at 38 (1988) [Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy]. 
 
26 Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38. 
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 Oliver Wendell Holmes, as quoted in Cooter and Ulen’s seminal text on law 
and economics,27 held that: “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man 
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics 
and master of economics. . . . We learn that for everything we have to give up 
something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other 
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect.”28   
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric of law and 
economics as follows: 
 [T]he most interesting aspect of the law and economics movement has been 
its aspiration to place the study of law on a scientific basis, with coherent 
theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of 
the hypotheses.  Law is . . . amenable to scientific study.  Economics is the 
most advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system contains many 
parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have studied 
successfully.29 
 
 [The economic] approach enables the law to be seen, grasped, and studied as 
a system—a system that economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as 
coherent, and in places improve.  By the same token, the approach enables 
economics to be seen as a tool for understanding and reforming social 
practices, rather than merely as a formal system of daunting mathematical 
complexity.30 
 
 
                                                 
27 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (5th ed. 2008) [Cooter & Ulen]. 
 
28 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469, 474 (1897), as quoted in 
Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 1. 
  
29 Richard A. Posner, Foreword, to Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, ESSAYS IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 5, 5 (1989) [Posner, Foreword], quoted in Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 1. 
 
30 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xxi. 
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 C. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics 
 
Contemporary law and economics is a discipline whose persuasion is built 
from the application of scientific analyses—especially mathematics and the 
quantitative analysis of empirical data—to social problems.31  Law is a discipline 
that attempts to deal with social problems, and legal issues and the social 
conditions created or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the law are problems or 
conditions that may be subjected to economic analyses “with coherent theory, 
precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of the 
hypotheses.”32 
   Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of legal rules on 
behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or common sense concerning human 
behavior.33  The theories are behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will 
respond to laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.34  Legal economists 
assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on the law because it has 
mathematically precise theories (price theory and game theory) and empirically 
sound methods (statistics and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules 
                                                 
31 Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39 (“Economics prides itself on its sciencelike 
character, and economists on their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values, 
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics] articles are 'written' in matrix 
algebra, complex econometrics, formal lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.  They would be 
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and techniques of advanced economics . . . 
[T]he language of formalism and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably 
'rhetorical.'”). See also Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting 
Norms in the Courtroom, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42-43, 59 (2009). 
 
32 Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5. 
 
33 See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4. 
 
34 See id. at 4. 
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and sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively rational) 
human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for individuals and for 
society.35 
 D. A Note about Levels of Rhetoric in Discourse 
 Before discussing the rhetorical canons of law and economics and their 
application to general legal discourse, I must pause to explain a rhetorical concept 
concerning levels of rhetoric.  Rhetoric, in the most complete sense, is the study of 
effective communication.36  Effectiveness in communication is determined by the 
audience and the situation.37  There can be multiple audiences that receive a 
communication, some are direct targets within the conception and understanding of 
the author in preparing the discourse, and others are indirect receivers of the 
discourse.  The level of communication, and thus the level of rhetoric, applied to the 
different audiences is not the same—not every audience will receive, decode, and 
draw meaning from the communication at the same level of understanding. 
 Building on the work of Wayne C. Booth, the late professor and a leading 
rhetorician from the University of Chicago (but not of the “Chicago School” of 
economics), I will explain the three levels of rhetorical persuasion: 
                                                 
35 See id. at 3, 4, 5.  See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (4th ed. 2007) [Harrison, 
Law and Economics]; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59. 
 
36 White, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 695; Gadamer, Expressive Power of Language, supra n.14, 
at 348; Mootz, supra n.14, at 317. 
 
37 Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra n.17, at 1546; Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric For Legal 
Writers, supra n.17, at 9; Makay, Speaking with an Audience, supra n.17, at 9. 
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Level 1 Rhetoric – Understanding of the Members of Discipline 
 Level 1 rhetoric (rhetoric-1) is true understanding and acceptance of the 
truth of the discourse by members of the discipline in which the discourse occurs, 
who are schooled and knowledgeable in the disciple and its theories.  This level of 
understanding is reserved to experts in the field.38 
Level 2 Rhetoric – Acceptance of the Persuasiveness of the Discourse by 
Understanding the Reliability of the Support 
 
 Level 2 rhetoric (rhetoric-2) is not a complete understanding of the discourse 
such as the understanding of members of the discipline of the discourse; the 
audiences for rhetoric-2 are receivers or decision-makers who do not completely 
understand the doctrine and theories of the discipline of the discourse.  However, 
level 2 reception of the discourse allows for the audience to accept the indicia of 
truth and reliability of the discourse based on an understanding of the reliability of 
the sources supporting the discourse that are used in the discourse39—scientific 
results, scholarly sources, accepted forms of evidence, works with known 
reputations—or the reliability of sources external to the discourse that support the 
discourse—the character and testimony of trusted recommenders and the 
observation of peer-acceptance of the work and the author by members of the same 
                                                 
38 See Booth, Idea of University, supra n. 22, at 12. 
 
39 See Wayne C. Booth, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT xiii, 112 & n.19 (1974).  See 
also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological 
Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1128 & 
n.44, 1156 & n.170, 1161-62 (2008) (quoting Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of 
Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1143-44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the 
elegant form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert testimony, even that based on natural 
or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique context—the law ....”)). 
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discipline who presumably have rhetoric-1 understanding of the material in the 
discourse.40  The acceptance of the reliability of the supporting sources allows for 
persuasion of the truth and reliability of the discourse even without fully 
understanding the discourse.41   
Level 3 Rhetoric – Persuasion by the Internal Consistency and 
Methodology of the Discourse 
 
 The third level of rhetoric (rhetoric-3) again is one in which the audience of 
decision-makers does not completely understand the truth of the discipline and its 
theories, but the audience observes the internal consistency and logic and how the 
discourse tracks under the evaluation of the design and execution of the 
discourse42—an evaluation that asks questions such as:  Do the methods used 
appear to be sound, does the author appear to be competent in employing them, and 
is the end product logical and internally consistent?43 An example would be the 
evaluation of a scholarly journal article to determine if the author appears to be 
competent and the writing consistent with the standards for scholarly inquiry and 
                                                 
40 Booth, Idea of University, supra n.22, at 12-13. 
 
41 Id.  Professor Ellen P. Goodman, in Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 
115 (2006), describes the communication theory of Jürgen Habermas that depends upon the 
existence of communicative action in discourse to “reach understanding” or “communicatively 
achieved agreement.” 1 Jürgen Habermas, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 42, 286-87, 305 
(orig. ed. 1981; Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Communicative action persuades by using a set of 
“validity claims.” Id. at 75, 308. News reporting of world events may make a “constative” utterance 
whose claim to validity is truth.  Id. at 309, 323. Storytelling and narrative reasoning may be 
considered “expressive” utterances whose claim to validity which is rooted in nothing more than 
sincerity.  Id. at 174, 325-26. “Regulative” utterances have a claim to validity of “rightness.” Id.  
Participants to communicative action can either accept these validity claims or subject them to 
criticism and demand justification.  Id. at 99. 
 
42 Booth, Idea of University, supra n.22, at 13-14. 
 
43 See id. 
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discourse within the academy or within one institution, such as a university, as a 
whole.44  Another rhetorical way of understanding this level of rhetoric is whether 
the author displays the proper ethos of her role in the creation of the discourse.45 
 In making recommendations for legal discourse based on the rhetoric of law 
and economics, I will mention the level of rhetoric of the device employed.  In many 
instances, it will not be rhetoric-1 discourse, that which an economist would aim to 
achieve when communicating with other economists, and law and economics 
scholars would aim to achieve when communicating with other law and economics 
scholars.  In most cases, the rhetorical devices described here will be modes of 
                                                 
44 Id. 
 
45 Ethos embodies both moral and intellectual qualities.  Jakob Wisse, ETHOS AND PATHOS FROM 
ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 30 (1989).  While virtue and high moral character obviously are concepts 
relating to the advocate’s ethics and morality, the concept of practical wisdom suggests that the 
audience must perceive the advocate’s reasoning as sound, not simply from a formal logical 
standpoint but in a broader sense of perceiving that the advocate possesses credibility and common 
sense.  Rhetoric, Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; Wisse, supra, at 30.  The concept of good will indicates that 
the advocate should evince good will and benevolence toward the audience as opposed to a spirit of 
malice revealed through attempted deception, obfuscation, or self-aggrandizement.  Rhetoric, Book 
II, ch. 1 at 1378a; Wisse, supra, at 30-33; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72-73.  Classical rhetoric 
focused as much on projecting the right moral character as in possessing it.  Michael Frost, Ethos, 
Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85, 100-01 (1994) [Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal 
Audience]; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72; Wisse, supra, at 31.  “[A] person seeming to have 
all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers.”  Rhetoric, Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a 
(emphasis added).  Good moral character can be projected through the discourse itself; it is not 
necessary that the advocate possess a widely-known reputation for uprightness and good moral 
character when entering into the proceedings or that the advocate self-consciously point out aspects 
and examples of his own good character in the discourse (although those means are recognized as 
being available to the advocate in proper circumstances if handled with appropriate delicacy).  See 
Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra, at 100-101; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72-73.  
The ethical appeal has particular importance in legal discourse because the modes of persuasion 
through enthymemes and examples present arguments based on probability not certainty of proof.  
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72.  Thus, it matters dearly when the audience weighs the 
persuasiveness of arguments and counter-arguments based on probability that the audience perceive 
the advocate as credible and believable, “possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character.”  
Id. (quoting 3 Quintilian, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 7, sec. viii at 13).  The slightest lapse in 
good sense, good will, or moral integrity might turn the audience away from acceptance of the 
arguments.  Id. at 73. 
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persuasion at the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 level of persuasion—persuasiveness 
based on the reliability of the support demonstrated in the rhetoric or 
persuasiveness based on the internal logic and methodology—in short, the ethos—of 
the discourse. 
 
II. The Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics 
 A. The Four Canons 
If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, then what is the rhetorical 
nature of this discipline when used as a rhetorical lens in the law?  I start with my 
summary of the rhetoric of the discipline introduced earlier: Economics combines 
mathematically precise theories and empirically sound methods of analyzing the 
effects of incentives and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to achieve 
efficient results for individuals and for society.46  From this, I derive the four canons 
of law and economics rhetoric: 
Mathematics and Science 
 
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and 
demonstration47 
 
                                                 
46 See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4, 5.  The rhetorician James Boyd White channeled the 
rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the legal system in the following way: “The 
overriding metaphor is that of the machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as 
the attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White, Rhetoric and 
Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 
LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 
1987) [White, Rhetoric and Law] (quoted in Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, 
at 114). 
 
47 Discussed in subsection 1 of this section.   
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Incentives and Costs 
 
The characterization of law and the legal system in the language of 
incentives and costs 48 
 
Efficiency 
 
The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency49 
 
 
Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice 
 
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral 
social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science50 
 
Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as topics of invention 
and arrangement and tropes of style in persuasive discourse.  The canons represent 
the fundamental assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and 
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and design and 
according to which theses concerning law and economics will be accepted as reliable 
and authoritative by the members of the law and economics discipline51—in other 
                                                 
 
48 Discussed in subsection 2 of this section. 
 
49 Discussed in subsection 3 of this section. 
 
50 Discussed in subsection 4 of this section. 
 
51 The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and varied, but for general 
reference, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 3-4, 9, 13, 21, 24-25, 495-96; Cooter & 
Ulen, supra n.27, at 2, 3, 4, 5, 41-43; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after 
Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); and the sources cited in subsections 1-4 of this 
section. 
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words, by the members of the law and economics discourse community.52  Therefore, 
these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law and economics. 
 
1. The Primacy of Mathematical and Scientific Methods of Analysis and 
Demonstration 
 
The practitioners of law and economics—those who follow the conventional 
and the contemporary approaches—rely on the inherent persuasiveness of 
mathematics and the methodologies of scientific proof both as a method of analysis 
and a form for the demonstration53 of the analysis.54  Members of the economic 
                                                 
52 Discourse community being a term that grounds this discussion as to the rhetoric of law and 
economics.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 419-38 (1995) (economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The 
Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing the 
discourse of law and economics). 
 
53 Demonstration and dialectic are the two principle forms of reasoning recognized by Aristotle.  See 
Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Book I, ch. 1 at 1354a; George A. Kennedy, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS 
CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 80 (1999) [Kennedy, Classical 
Rhetoric].  See also P. Christopher Smith, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: 
DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC (1998).  Rhetoric is the form of demonstration used in 
argumentative persuasion or “continuous discourse,” whereas dialectic is more appropriate to debate.  
Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, supra at 66.  Demonstration provides the rhetorical process of 
arrangement with two paradigms of deductive reasoning, sullogismos (syllogisms) and enthumema 
(enthymemes), Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 38-60; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, supra, at 83-
84; Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/ 
aristotle-rhetoric/> (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002), and two paradigms of 
inductive reasoning, the induction and the example.  See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book 
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disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical, scientific deduction 
and induction to prove propositions.55  The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive 
forms) and the induction and example (inductive forms) are topoi of invention and 
arrangement in science, mathematics, and rhetorical demonstration.56 
Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical primacy of 
scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, designing 
the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, and 
information collected to test the hypotheses.57  Law and economics also assumes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 
752 & n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the Development of 
Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367, 372-73 (1999). 
 
54 See Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, 
at 3, 4; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59; 
 
55 George Pólya, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF MATHEMATICS AND 
PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752, 
760.  The pros and cons of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is 
growing in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009-10.  E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith versus 
Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 
445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010). 
 
56 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the 
structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See Aristotle, The 
Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1, at 1355a.  The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides 
the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, 
and TREAT.  Michael D. Murray & Christy H. DeSanctis, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7 
(2009) (discussing IRAC and TREAT); Linda H. Edwards, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND 
ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and 
persuasive discourse); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to 
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 484-87, 492 (2003) [Robbins, Paradigm Lost] 
(discussing IRAC and IREAC); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: 
Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006) 
(discussing IRAC and IREAC). 
 
57 See Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 15-16; 
Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies—An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 
437, 437 (1972).  See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, 
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 
(1998); Gary Minda, supra n.52, at 611-12. 
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rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to demonstrate 
the analyses and communicate its theses about human behavior.58   
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and prescriptions are 
informed by scientific testing and mathematical analysis of data not just by logic, 
intuition, common sense, ideology, or philosophy.59  The methods of examination 
and the assumptions made that are supported by the rhetoric of contemporary law 
and economics and law and behavioral science are those that are susceptible to 
scientific proof through the application of mathematical and scientific methods of 
analysis of empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses and assumptions about 
human behavior in the context of the law.60  But the propositions chosen to be 
proved, and especially the design of the experiments or studies that will be 
adequate and reliable to prove the propositions, rely on rhetoric—the rhetoric being 
that which is held within the disciplines to be reasonable, reliable, and provable 
using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology.61   
                                                 
58 See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990)); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980). 
 
59 E.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4, 5. 
 
60 See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Louis Kaplow, et al., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372, 375-77 
(2003). 
 
61 Compare Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 678-79, 682 (1999), and John M. 
Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems in 
Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992), and Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On 
Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of 
Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992), with Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational 
Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54, 
61-63, 121-124 (1996) [Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises], and David R. Dow, Godel 
and Langdell - A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal Theory, 44 HASTINGS 
L.J. 707 (1993), and Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219 
(1993). 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 23 of 83 
 
Mathematics is a language, and like any other language, is rhetorical.62  
Mathematics is a wonderful tool of analysis, but the elevation of mathematical 
forms and models as the primary method of demonstration in economic rhetoric 
comes with a warning for the application of this trope in general legal discourse:  it 
is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and social condition can be subjected 
to mathematical analysis.63  Albert Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of 
mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, 
they do not refer to reality.”64  
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral scientist has 
proved, is inherently rhetorical in nature,65 and it is a powerfully persuasive word.  
An assertion that something is proved or even can be proved is a rhetorical 
assertion because even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions 
that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.66  The differences in 
                                                 
 
62 See Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson, Probability and Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A 
Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of Interdisciplinarity, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 447, 483-84 (2002); Donald 
N. McCloskey, The Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase's The Nature Of The Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 425, 425-
26, 428-31 (1993); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the 
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (1987); Townsend, Implications of 
Foundational Crises, supra n.61, at 62-63, 141; David N. Haynes, The Language and Logic of Law: A 
Case Study, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 186-87, 220 (1981). 
 
63 See generally Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881, 889-90 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331-32 (1971); Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets 
Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1379, 1383-84 (2010). 
 
64 Albert Einstein, quoted in F. Capra, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 27 (1975). 
 
65 McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752, 760. 
 
66 See Susan K. Houser, Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1152 
(1993); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136 n.3 (1992); Anthony D'Amato, 
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opinions as to what are reasonable, reliable, and provable assumptions and 
predictions in economics using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative 
methodology has led to internal divisions within the law and economics community, 
and led directly to the creation of the law and behavioral science discipline, as 
discussed in subsection 4 below.   
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms in law and economics—the use of 
mathematics as a trope of arrangement and style in the demonstration—is to this 
author the most intriguing aspect of this canon, and the most delicate topic from 
which to draw prescriptions for legal discourse.  The appearance of mathematical 
certainty in law and economics rhetoric is an attractive tool, but is it too seductive? 
Critics have challenged legal economists for adopting complex mathematical 
formulae to demonstrate findings whose relevance to actual legal problems and 
social conditions is said to be specious.67  Nevertheless, the a priori, ex ante, 
positivist application of mathematical formulas to legal topics and problems has led 
the practitioners of neoclassical law and economics to claim their greatest 
successes.68 
                                                                                                                                                             
Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 597 (1989); 
Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 956, 999 n.214 (1986); Steven P. Goldberg, 
On Legal and Mathematical Reasoning, 22 JURIMETRICS 83, 87 n.26 (1981); Roy Stone, Affinities and 
Antinomies in Jurisprudence, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281. 
 
67 E.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A 
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485-90 (1987); Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, 
supra n.25, at 38; McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, supra n.23, at 44-45. 
 
68 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xix (championing the unity, simplicity, and power, 
but also the subtlety, of economic principles); Richard Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: 
A View from Economics, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 (1995); James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and 
Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 
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I explained above that my purpose here is not to critique the benefits or costs 
of the use of the canons of law and economics in the economic analysis of law.  My 
purpose is to explore the application of these rhetorical canons in legal discourse 
generally.  On the one hand, mathematics is a language, and thus rhetorical, and its 
particular form of persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the open demonstration of 
the truth and logic of its workings.69  On the other hand, mathematical forms of 
demonstration may be employed to attempt to overcome “the difference between 
truth in mathematics and truth in law—between logical truths and rhetorical or 
dialectical or polemical truths”70—by cloaking the legal discourse in the rhetorical 
garb of mathematics71 and science,72 making the findings appear to be more certain 
                                                                                                                                                             
L. & HIST. REV. 275, 287-88 (1997);  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal 
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have enabled neoclassical 
economics and public choice theory to describe both private and public markets by means of 
mathematical models that have great elegance and rhetorical power."). 
 
69 See McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 761, 763; Schmidt, supra n.53, 
at 395-96; Kronman, supra n.61, at 679. 
 
70 See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. 
L. REV. 604 (1983) (citing two of the most influential modern rhetoricians, Kenneth Burke, Politics as 
Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 45, 46-47 (1982); and Chaim Perelman, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS 
ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 120-74 (1980); Chaim Perelman, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE 
HUMANITIES 1-61, 117-33 (1979)).  The difference between formal logic and the absolute proof of the 
syllogism, and informal logic used in everyday discourse to assert the most probable arguments in 
everyday situations, is one of the primary impetuses that motivated the move to contemporary 
schools of rhetoric building on the work of Burke and Perelman.  See also Burke, A Grammar of 
Motives, supra n.19; Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, supra n.19; Perelman, Realm of Rhetoric, supra 
n.19; Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, supra n.19.  Pigou, one of the forefathers of 
neoclassical law and economics, pointed out the distinction between formal logic and pure 
mathematics on the one side and the "realistic sciences" on the other, as to which economics was to 
be a realistic science.  A. C. Pigou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) (“On the one side 
are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function it is to discover implications. 
On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, which are 
concerned with actualities.”). 
 
71 E.g., McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 753-54; James R. Hackney, Jr., 
UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 
(2007); Joseph Vining, The Gift of Language, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1998).  See also 
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and absolute than they really are.  This possibility sends a significant message of 
caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific forms in general 
legal discourse. 
With what I hope is appropriate caution dictated by this discussion, in section 
III(A), I will describe the canon of mathematics and science in: (1) rhetoric-1-2-3 
uses of mathematical scientific forms as a topic of invention and arrangement 
(mathematical and logical structures and modeling of information) at all three 
levels of rhetorical persuasion; and (2) rhetoric-3 uses of mathematical and scientific 
forms as a trope of style (mathematical structures and forms used as a metaphor to 
stimulate thinking and imagination).73 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gary Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4; Dan Ariely, George 
Loewenstein, & Drazan Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable 
Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73-106 (2003) (demonstrating how the illusion of stable, ordered 
preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors). 
 
72 McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, supra n.4, at 147; Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: 
Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: 
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 478-81 (1974).  The excessively persuasive 
effect of scientific demonstration is a problem in non-economic legal settings, too, such as evidence 
law.  See, e.g., Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND 
PRACTICE § 7.8, at 992 (1995) (“Scientific proof may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay factfinders, 
especially if it comes dressed up in technical jargon, complicated mathematical or statistical 
analysis, or involves a magic machine (‘black box’) that may seem to promise more than it delivers”); 
John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by 
Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 n.81 (1992) (“There is virtual 
unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be ‘scientific’ in 
nature will have particularly persuasive effect.”). See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific evidence “assume[s] a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a 
jury of laymen”); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing scientific 
testimony's “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”).  But see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the 
Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror 
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993) (jurors are able to evaluate 
competing scientific and technical testimony). 
 
73  Michael I. Meyerson, Mathematics and the Legal Imagination: A Response to Edelman, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 477, 478 (2002) ("mathematics can trigger a non-mathematical imagination and create 
mental images that permit new ways of thinking about non-mathematical topics"). 
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2. The characterization of law and the legal system in the language 
of incentives and costs 
 
 The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and economics begins with 
a seminal insight of economics:  that people respond to incentives74 and that the law 
(legal rules and the legal system) can create incentives that can influence human 
behavior in one direction and can create disincentives that can influence human 
behavior in the other direction.75  Legal rules and the legal system can “encourage 
socially desirable conduct and discourage undesirable conduct” by rewarding or 
subsidizing certain behavior and punishing or taxing other behavior.76  Legal rules 
and the legal system can increase the costs of certain behavior or lesson the costs of 
other behavior.77 
 The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical;78 it is both an 
assumption and a presumption that shapes the predictions that analysts using the 
                                                 
74 Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054; Yuval Feldman & Doron 
Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 987 (2009). 
 
75 See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
405, 412-14 (2005); Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1127, 
1132 (1991); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1043. 
 
76 Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054.  See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence 
Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 343-47 (1989); 
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on 
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 164-65 (1996); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: 
Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711 (2008). 
 
77 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 84; Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science, supra n.5, at 1054; Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions 
and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 284-86 (1998); Peter Reuter, A Just Use of 
Economics or Just Use Economics, 70 CAL. L. REV. 850, 853-54 (1982). 
 
78 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 
(1996) (discussing the rhetoric of incentives in copyright law); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (same). 
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methodology of law and economics can make about the effects of law and the 
recommendations that these analysts are willing to make about changes to the 
law.79 Law and economics imported this assumption from economics, along with the 
assumption that people react rationally to incentives.80  
 Economists’ examination of human behavior within various legal and social 
environments of the world involves the characterization of many phenomena as 
either incentives or costs.81  The canon of incentives and costs states that humans 
and human institutions facing a choice in conditions of scarce resources (thus 
requiring a choice) will act in ways that achieve or realize (maximize) the incentives 
and avoid (minimize) the costs.82  When the actor under examination is government, 
the rhetoric of the discipline defines the benefits and rewards offered or imposed by 
government as incentives and the costs imposed or perpetuated by government as 
taxes or externalities.83  When the actors under examination are private parties, the 
                                                 
79 See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law and 
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1795-96 & nn.42-44 (2003) (discussing “overadvocacy” of legal 
incentives); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054. 
 
80 George Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 1982 REGULATION 13-16 (May-June 1982); Russell 
Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781, 795 
(2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054. 
 
81 See Balganesh, supra n.78, at 1591-92; Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal 
Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589-92 
(2008); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral 
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1141-42, 1198-99 (2001); Korobkin & 
Ulen, supra n.5, at 1058. 
 
82 Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral 
Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 448-49 (2004); Philip B. Heymann, The Problem 
of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 829-30, 848-49 (1973); Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 4. 
 
83 See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 
1447, 1463-64 (1991); W. Keller, TAX INCIDENCE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH (1980); Richard 
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rhetoric of the discipline defines incentives and costs in economic terms such as 
offers, inducements, price, or rent.84  The presumption is that human actions are 
motivated to alter their behavior in response to incentives and costs.85 
 The language of economics—cost, benefit, incentives, disincentives, 
externalities, and economics—already is widely embraced in the law.  Courts and 
scholars alike have widely embraced the language of incentives and costs in their 
discussions of law and legal analysis as part of the general acceptance of economic 
considerations in legal analysis, as suggested by the following chart: 
                                                                                                                                                             
A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1982); 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 22. 
 
84 Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: 
An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 492-94 (1988); Joseph F. Brodley & 
Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1167-68 (1993); Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 
589, 600-01 (2005); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of 
Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological” Account, and Some Illustrative 
Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327, 329-30 & n.3 (1993). 
 
85 George Stigler, supra n.80, at 13-16; Korobkin, supra n.80, at 781, 795; Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law, supra n.2, at 4. 
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Database86 
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term “cost” 
with 
“benefit”87 
Cases or 
Articles using 
the term 
“incentive” with 
“law” “legal” or 
“government”88 
Cases or Articles 
using the term 
“disincentive” 
with “law” “legal” 
or “government”89 
Cases or Articles 
using the term 
“externality(ies)”
90  
Cases or 
Articles using 
the term 
“economic(s)” 
with “law” or 
“analysis”91 
ALLFEDS 5225 2093 186 170 4303 
ALLSTATES 3423 924 88 86 1935 
JLR 10,000+92 10,000+ 1447 10,000+ 10,000+ 
BRIEFS 1465 536 58 43 1014 
 
This chart (a taxonomy, an economic-friendly demonstration of data—a topos 
of arrangement or trope of style) indicates that the language (i.e., the rhetoric) of 
costs and incentives is fairly common in legal analysis among courts and in legal 
scholarship.  Legal authors—judges, scholars, and practitioners—already are 
employing incentives and costs language in substantive legal discourse with 
significant frequency.  Every time an author writes about a cost-benefit analysis, 
every time a change in the law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct, every time a 
license or permit application process is said to provide a disincentive to an activity, 
every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an “externality” on the 
                                                 
 
86 Westlaw database for all federal cases since 1945, all state cases since 1945, all journals and law 
review articles, and appellate briefs filed in ten state courts of appeals (Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin) with 
coverage of appellate briefs ranging by state; the earliest coverage is 1991-present (Washington) and 
the latest is 2006-present (Arizona). 
 
87 Westlaw search terms used:  cost /2 benefit. 
 
88 Westlaw search terms used:  incentive /5 law legal government. 
 
89 Westlaw search terms used:  disincentive /5 law legal government. 
 
90 Westlaw search terms used:  externalit! 
 
91 Westlaw search terms used:  economic /2 law analysis 
 
92 Entries marked 10,000+ indicate search results exceeding 10,000 documents (articles). 
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cost of litigation, the author uses a rhetorical trope of style (a figure of speech) to 
discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not 
necessarily business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of 
pecuniary sums or damages.93 
 The basic statement that humans respond favorably to incentives and not 
favorably to costs disguises the rhetorical complexity of this presumption when it 
comes to making predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in 
response to legal conditions.  First, incentives or costs must be designed, 
communicated, and recognized by human actor or institution; government must 
correctly design and communicate its actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the 
tax that government intends to offer to or impose on its audience of citizens, and 
private actors must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to offer the 
correct intended inducement or impose the intended price or rent.94  Second, and 
equally important to the rhetoric of the discipline, is the fact that the action must be 
perceived and understood by the human audience, the object or recipient of 
                                                 
93 In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the 
calculation of damages in almost every area of law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the 
substantive elements of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages.  
In addition, at the level of rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for 
persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical 
and quantitative analyses of empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant 
tabular presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion.  In both categories, the 
direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of 
evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language to convince the reader of the 
evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is rhetorical.  See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra n.19, 
at 118-21; Thomas Conley, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Fred A. Simpson & 
Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts—Aristotle and the Rules of Evidence, 34 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003). 
 
94 See subsection 4 infra. 
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government’s or a private actor’s action, and what should be perceived and 
understood as an incentive as opposed to a cost is not always a simple process for 
humans.95 
The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is most closely associated with the 
canon of rational choice: the design, communication, perception, and motivation 
concerning incentives and costs requires analysis and an understanding of the 
rhetorical audience and the rhetorical situation.96 Scientific empirical analysis of 
human behavior indicates that there are limitations on humans’ abilities to 
understand and appreciate benefits and costs.97 These limitations are assumed and 
represented in the rhetorical statement that humans are creatures of “bounded” 
abilities – bounded rationality, bounded ability to gather information, bounded 
perception, and bounded cognition.  These bounds limit humans’ abilities to 
perceive and understand the incentives and costs set before them, which in turn 
complicates the predictions and prescriptions of economists regarding the 
                                                 
95 See subsection 4 infra. 
 
96 When is a situation “rhetorical”? —When the audience of the message in the situation has the 
opportunity to alter reality. When the audience has no choice, the situation is not rhetorical.   A 
situation is made up of:  subject—place—time—audience—speaker.  See Bitzer, The Rhetorical 
Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80. 
 
97 E.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640 (1999) [Hanson & Kysar]; Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral 
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, supra n.5, at 1471; 
Symposium: The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669 
(1996); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998). 
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motivational effect of incentives and costs.  This is the rhetorical “audience” 
consideration with incentives and costs.   
Separately, there is the mounting scientific empirical evidence of the social, 
cognitive, and brain sciences that indicates that humans are situational decision-
makers.98  A consideration of the rhetorical problems of audience and situation are 
commonplace in rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric in particular has covered this 
ground well.99 
  Section III(B) will describe the canon of incentives and costs in: (1) rhetoric-3 
uses of incentives and costs as a trope of style (i.e., a figure of speech using 
incentives and costs as a metaphor in discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-
3 concept of organization and presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention 
and arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse and whether 
it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).  
                                                 
98 See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational 
Character, supra n.2;  Hanson & Kysar, supra n.102, at 640. 
 
99 E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 695 (“Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it 
invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and 
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, 
about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language. 
Rhetoric always takes place with given materials.”); Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at 
6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80. 
     The contemporary analysis of communication produces a formula for the speaker’s invention of 
discourse crafted for a given situation:  Exigence (a/k/a the rhetorical problem, the reason for 
speaking, and the urgency thereof) + Audience (mediators of change—those who may be moved from 
one point to another in the situation) + Constraints (the physical or psychological limitations or 
opportunities of the situation) = Fitting response (the speaker’s purpose and objectives).  See Bitzer, 
The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 390-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80.  This model 
easily can be applied to economic analysis—if the object of the incentive has no choice, then there is 
no opportunity for theorizing rational choice of incentives in that situation. 
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 3. The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency 
 There are two kinds of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and economics:  
(1) formal efficiency as a preference for simple, elegant formulae and solutions 
(Rhetoric-3 Efficiency), and (2) the substantive economic concepts of efficiency as a 
standard and goal of law and policy (Rhetoric-1 and Rhetoric-2 Efficiency).  Both 
modes employ a highly rhetorical turn.  The adoption and application of the 
rhetorical primacy of science and mathematics carries other implications for the 
discipline, including, for example, that a more efficient (elegant) solution to a 
problem is preferred under the rhetoric of mathematics and science and 
subsequently under the rhetoric of economics and the rhetoric of law and 
economics.100  The formal desire for efficiency in structure and form leads to a 
rhetoric-3 level of priority for elegance and simplicity in the equations and formulae 
of the discipline.101  Naturally, elegant and effective formulae that are substantively 
correct make an important impact on the rhetoric-1 level of understanding of 
economists, but I describe this mode as offering rhetoric-3 persuasion because non-
economists can appreciate the persuasiveness of an elegant formula and simple 
solution because this mode of presentation promotes clarity and openness, revealing 
the workings and falsifiability of the reasoning. 
                                                 
100 “Mathematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in the realm of law, that 
combines logic with human experience, a mere afterthought.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science, supra n.5, at 1054.   
 
101 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 4, 
5 (1994); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 16. 
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In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and advocates efficiency 
over more abstract concepts of fairness, morality, and justice.102  This is not to say 
that fairness, morality, and justice are never incorporated into an economic 
analysis, but that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts into the 
rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency—in other words, assuming for purposes of 
a model or prescription that a fair, moral, and just solution will be more efficient 
according to one of the economic conceptions of efficiency.103  Efficiency (or 
parsimony) in the rhetoric of law and economics is not just a formal imperative for 
methods and procedures of modeling paradigms and the formulation of hypotheses 
and theses, but it also has been advanced as a substantive and instrumental 
imperative in positive examination of conditions, normative analysis of possible 
conditions, and prescriptions for future conditions.104  Efficiency, therefore, has 
become a rhetorical imperative in and of itself in law and economics.105 
                                                 
102 E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What can be Gained by 
Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1998) [Korobkin & Ulen, Efficiency and 
Equity]. 
 
103 See, e.g., Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The 
Integration of Fairness Into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 284-86, 316-17 (1998); Henrik Lando, 
An Attempt to Incorporate Fairness into an Economic Model of Tort Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
575 (1997); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative Law and Economics, 18 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157 (1994).  See generally Ken Binmore, PLAYING FAIR: GAME 
THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1994); Ken Binmore, JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1998); Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996); Hervé Moulin, COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC 
INTRODUCTION 3, 8 (1995); H. Peyton Young, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (1994). 
 
104 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 13-16; Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 3-6 (1993); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward 
a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 345-46 (1984); Robert D. Cooter, Law 
and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of 
the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1260, 1263 (1982) (“A process is efficient when it yields the 
maximum output from given input, or equivalently, when it yields a given output with the minimum 
input.”); Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. 
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   The elevation of efficiency over other concepts associated with the law, such 
as fairness, morality, and justice, makes the work of law and economics simpler and 
easier in many ways,106 but more difficult in other ways.107  The substantive 
meaning of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and economics is a clever twist on a 
common word to add a very specific, and nonintuitive meaning for efficiency in law 
and economics—and not just one meaning.  In the rhetoric of economics, substantive 
and instrumental “efficiency” is defined in three, carefully crafted ways:  productive 
efficiency (sometime referred to by the undistinguishing term of economic 
efficiency), in which a process or action produces the intended result with maximum 
utility and minimum costs;108 Pareto efficiency 109 (allocative efficiency), in which 
                                                                                                                                                             
L. REV. 307, 309 (1979) [Michelman, Comment]; Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the 
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1032-35 (1978) [Michelman, Norms]. 
 
105 “Although efficiency need not be the sole or primary goal of legal policy, economic analysis of law 
teaches that policymakers ignore the efficiency implications of their actions at society's peril. Legal 
rights that are unobjectionable in the abstract are not free but rather must be measured against 
their opportunity costs.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054 (inner 
citations omitted). 
 
106 Cass R. Sunstein, On Philosophy and Economics, 19 QUINN. L. REV. 333, 335-36, 348 (2000); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-4, 9-10 (2d ed. 1989) [Polinsky, Law 
and Economics]; Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
281, 301 (1979). 
 
107 E.g., Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, supra n.5, at 1508-09 (“laws may be efficient solutions to the 
problems of organizing society . . . [but] [t]he notion that laws emerge from considerations of 
efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most citizens as odd. . . . many laws 
on the books appear to be difficult to justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit 
mutually beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to benefit groups that do not 
have much lobbying power (such as the poor or middle class)”). 
 
108 R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A 
Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679, 690-91 (2000); Joseph F. Brodley, The 
Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1028-29 (1987).  See also Walter Nicholson, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC 
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 611-20 (9th ed. 2004); Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 17. 
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the situation cannot be altered to benefit one of the parties in the situation without 
making the other party worse off—better or worse off referring to the individual, 
subjective perceptions and preferences of the parties;110 and potential Pareto 
improvements or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, in which incremental gains in benefits or 
incentives created by a change in action exceed incremental losses or costs imposed 
by the change in action.111 
 The language of efficiency is intended to facilitate rhetoric-1 level 
communication within the economics discourse community and rhetoric-2 level 
communication to facilitate the advocacy of the discipline to the outside world.  
Within the discipline, the rhetoric of law and economics assumes that it is easier to 
conceive of models of efficiency and form hypotheses of efficiency and to test these 
models and hypotheses of efficiency through scientific and mathematical methods of 
analysis than it would be to test fairness, morality, and justice using scientific and 
mathematical analyses.  As rhetoric-2 discourse, the models and forms that are 
developed give the appearance of rigorous scientific analysis that “proves” the 
hypotheses that a certain course or change in law produces efficient results, 
                                                                                                                                                             
109 See Vilfredo Pareto, 4 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF SOCIETY 1459, 1465-69 
(1907) (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907); Vilfredo Pareto, MANUAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (1906) (Ann. S. Schwier trans., 1971); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 12. 
 
110 See Polinsky, Law and Economics, supra n.111, at 7 n. 4; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 
supra n.2,  at 13, 14, 26; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical & Political Bases of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980); Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27,  at 17; 
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Jules 
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to 
Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980).  See also Hal R. Varian, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160-71 (3d ed. 
1992); Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 103-10, 433-35 (8th ed. 1920); Arthur Cecil Pigou, 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 31-43 (1952). 
 
111 See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27,  at 18. 
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whichever of the three forms of “efficient” results are assumed in the models and 
hypotheses.  
 The success or failure of models and hypotheses concerning one or more of the 
economic definitions of efficiency is easier to observe through scientific and 
mathematical methods of analysis of statistics and econometric data than it would 
be to test a model or hypothesis of fairness, morality, or justice.  Success or failure is 
a highly desirable observation of any practical study, and models and hypotheses of 
fairness, morality, and justice may suffer from the fact that they may be 
tautological and non-falsifiable within the rhetorical definitions of fairness, 
morality, and justice in the law, philosophy, or ethics.  However, rational humans 
embrace concepts of fairness, morality, and justice, and act on them, which 
complicates economics predictions and prescriptions as to the effect of law and legal 
conditions.    
 Therefore, Section III(C) will discuss the following prescriptions for legal 
discourse:   (1) rhetoric-1 substantive uses of the term efficiency that are employed 
in the economic efficiency-sense where it is evident that simple avoidance of waste 
and reduction in costs (transactional, collateral, or externalities) is a valued goal in 
the area of law under analysis;112 (2) rhetoric-3 coding of language relevant to the 
substantive analysis to emphasize efficiency—i.e., the framing, phrasing, and 
defining of elements of the analysis in terms of efficiency in ways that are 
                                                 
112 Many areas of law are compatible with this goal, not just environmental law or contract law, but 
careful consideration to preeminent considerations of justice and fairness, for example, in criminal 
law, may dominate the rhetorical decision whether to advocate efficiency. 
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persuasive and rhetorically valuable; (3) rhetoric-3 formal applications of 
composition, arrangement, and style of legal discourse, elevating elegance and 
efficiency in form, structure, and composition to benefit clarity and falsifiability.113 
4. The Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice 
 Law and economics presumes that human actors in legal situations are 
rational and will act in rational ways in response to legal conditions.  The early 
adopters of the law and economics analysis of law accepted a rhetorical assumption 
that when faced with choices, humans will respond rationally in making their 
choices, rather than acting randomly, capriciously, and, most importantly for the 
discipline of law and economics, predictably.114 The rhetoric of this position is 
known generally as rational choice theory.115 
Over the last five decades, rational choice theory employed by law and 
economics analysts has produced marked success in explaining and predicting 
human behavior when humans are confronted by incentives, costs, or opportunities, 
and many of these successes have been applied to make accurate predictions of the 
effect of existing laws or changes in the law on the behavior of humans subject to 
the laws.116 The successes produced under the rational choice theory lead some to 
argue that rational choice theory, defined broadly enough, and shaped to encompass 
                                                 
113 Formal applications of efficiency will benefit persuasion by promoting clarity and comprehension 
of meaning over confusion and frustration.  They also open doors to falsifiability—doors that are 
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation.  Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted 
are highly persuasive. 
 
114 See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1055. 
 
115 Id. 
 
116 See id. at 1053-54. 
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all areas where predictions are reliable and verifiable and to exclude the areas and 
phenomenon where predictions are unreliable and refutable, is all that an economic 
approach to the law requires.117  In fact, some argue that the “correction” applied to 
economics by behavioral science—to reject many if not most of the assumptions 
represented by the rational choice theory—means that a behavioral approach to law 
and economics does not fit within the rhetoric of economics or law and economics at 
all.118 They argue that analysts of behavioral science may be applying psychology, 
or sociocultural, or cognitive theories to the law, but they are not applying 
economics.119  This is indeed a crisis within the rhetoric of the discipline. 
 The definition of what it means to be “rational” in response to legal conditions 
and the weight given to the presumption of rationality differs depending on the 
legal situation that is being studied and the legal economist that is studying the 
situation.  Cognitive science has indicated that situations affect decision making in 
ways that are contrary to traditional rational choice theory of maximizing self 
interest.120  A large part of the correction in the rhetoric of traditional law and 
economics advanced by the proponents of a behavioral approach to law and 
                                                 
 
117 Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1553-58 (1998) [Posner, Rational Choice]. 
 
118 Id. at 1558 (“If there is any theory in their approach, it is not an economic theory.”).  See section C 
infra. 
 
119 Posner, Rational Choice, supra n.122, at 1558 (“They take a psychological approach to phenomena 
that are sociological and psychological as much as they are economic, yet call their approach 
economic. . . . [Their approach] would be easier to understand if it were offered to the reader as a 
contribution to the psychological analysis of law rather than to the economic analysis of law.”). 
 
120 See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational 
Character, supra n.2.  
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economics is a correction in the definition of rationality and the weight given to the 
presumption of rationality in the face of various legal conditions.121  The behavioral 
approach asserts that the definition of rationality and its weight in making 
predictions about human behavior in the face of legal conditions must be modified 
with the knowledge and understanding gained from behavioral science, which gives 
a clearer picture of the nature and limits of human rationality in response to legal 
situations. 
 The acceptance or at least the acknowledgement that rational choice is more 
bounded than traditional rational choice theories and models have predicted 
presents a problem for the rhetoric of the discipline and complexity in the use of 
rational choice theory as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse.  The rhetoric of the 
discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of “rational” so as to incorporate 
the empirical observations of seemingly non-traditional, irrational behavior in legal 
situations requiring a choice.122  For example, in response to the ultimatum game 
studies,123 “rational” as a definition may be modified from a strict position that one 
                                                 
121 “There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-and-economics communities 
about precisely what rational choice theory is and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the 
law-and-economics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a relatively weak, or thin,  
presumption that individuals act to maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a 
relatively strong, or thick,  presumption that individuals act to maximize their self-interest.” 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1055 (inner citations omitted). 
 
122 In fact, it is only rational for law and economics scholars to attempt to preserve the theory of 
rational choice by expanding the definition of “rational” as this will avoid throwing out the entire 
canon of rational choice as an operative foundation for economic models, theories, and predictions. 
 
123 Ultimatum game studies test the theory that when a person is assigned a sum and asked to offer 
a portion of the sum to another person with the understanding that if the other person accepts the 
offer, both will take away something—the offeror keeps the remainder of the sum not offered, and 
the offeree keeps what was offered and accepted—but neither person will take away anything if the 
offer is not accepted.  Traditional rational choice theory predicted that a tiny sum would be offered 
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will act to maximize selfish pecuniary interests to a broader definition that one will 
act to maximize his or her own interests of whatever kind, one interest being the 
motivation to be and to be perceived as being fair in bargaining.   
 Whether the rational choice theory is definitional (e.g., humans rationally 
make choices to maximize their ends),124 or based on a conception that humans 
make choices to maximize their expected utility from the choices made,125  or based 
on an assumption of human self-interest,126 or humans’ motivation toward wealth 
maximization,127 the consequences for legal discourse points to the same goal:  that 
                                                                                                                                                             
because this maximizes the offeror’s pecuniary self interest, while allowing the offeree to take away 
something, however small.  The studies belied this prediction by observing that offerees routinely 
rejected small offers, for example less than 20% of the sum, and offerors tended to offer much larger 
sums, frequently in the range of 40-50% of the sum assigned.  Theories arising from these empirical 
data revolve around the concept of fairness and the parties’ perception of what is fair in the 
situation—that offerees will not accept an offer that is perceived to be unfair even though any offer, 
no matter how small, increased their pecuniary well being, and offerors offered a greater portion 
with an apparent motivation of trying to be fair or at least to be perceived as being fair.  This 
prompts researchers to include fairness and the perception of fairness as factors in conceptions of 
rational self interest.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of 
Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for 
Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within 
Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 474-75 (2000); 
Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1818-19 (2000); Richard 
Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1, 33-39 (1999); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 433, 459. 
 
124 See Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implications for Law and Public 
Policy, 3 LEG. THEORY 23, 24 (1997); Korobkin & Ulen, at 1061. 
 
125 See Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF 
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 (1994); Geoffrey Brennan, Comment, What Might 
Rationality Fail to Do, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 51, 52 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi 
eds., 1990); Scott Plous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 83 (1993); Korobkin 
& Ulen, supra n.5, at 1062. 
 
126 Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1765, 1766 (1998); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law 
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1986); Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1065. 
 
127 Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1066; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 26; Polinsky, Law and 
Economics, supra n.111, at 10. 
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law should be communicated to people in a manner that maximizes the incentives 
to the reader to accept and be persuaded by the legal communication, and 
minimizes the costs imposed by the communication.  In Section III(D), I will discuss 
the rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice theory in three areas:  
(1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to respond to biases and heuristics and to 
situational conditions on rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement; 
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and syllogistic 
structure) to appeal to a rational audience; and (3) rhetoric-3 uses of metaphor, 
parable/mythical/fable forms, character archetypes, and other forms of narrative 
reasoning as tropes of style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other 
heuristics and biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from modern 
cognitive studies and brain science.  
 B. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics
 Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a manner that 
reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive exercise; all of the canons work 
together and simultaneously to affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the 
discipline or activity.  Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of the 
other canons, making them more or less persuasive.  In classical rhetoric, the three 
canons of invention (aspects of persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the 
author or speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos,128 are often depicted as a 
                                                 
128 See Covino & Joliffe, supra n.16, at 17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Michael 
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127 (1992) 
[Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis]; Robin Smith, Aristotle's Logic, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2004 ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
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rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to another and the 
combined impact on the recipient of the discourse: 
 
 
 
 
With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse presents the 
concept as a linear flow-chart129: 
 
James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder – Signal – Decoder, linking the 
author, the language or message, and the reader or audience to reality.130  The 
author projects his ethos along with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos 
of the message so as to influence the pathos of the audience.131  
 The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.132  Aristotle sought to 
remind advocates that an argument is not one-dimensional.  The most logically 
                                                                                                                                                             
sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/> (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit Oct. 5, 2000) 
[Smith, Aristotle’s Logic]; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 71-84; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 
supra n.54, at 68, 75, 82, 89. 
 
129 Wisse, supra n.45, at 8. 
 
130 See James L. Kinneavy, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [Kinneavy, 
Theory of Discourse]; Phelps, supra n.9, at 1091; Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The 
Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000) [Berger, 
Reflective Rhetorical Model]. 
 
131 Wisse, supra n.45, at 7-8. 
 
132 See Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1717, 1728-29 (1995); Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 614, 624, 625, 627. 
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constructed argument still will not persuade an audience if the audience questions 
the knowledge, skill, or credibility of the author.  Similarly, the most respected 
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the day if her 
argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes apart at the seams with a 
single, gentle tug at one of its logical flaws.  An ironclad argument may be delivered 
in such a way as to antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be 
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and credibility of the 
author.133 
 The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact together at the same 
time and toward the same audience.  Proper economic discourse incorporates each 
canon for the persuasion of the audience.  There is a connection and interaction in 
the discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion of the 
audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of efficiency, mathematical and 
scientific certainty, response to incentives, and even rational choice without 
affecting the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse.  An 
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon puts the others at 
risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience.  As with classical rhetorical modes of 
invention, the interaction of the canons of law and economics may be depicted 
visually, although with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle: 
                                                 
 
133 See generally Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra n.45; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, 
at 72-73. 
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 In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse (Speaker) codes the 
discourse (Message) for a particular receiver (Audience) according to the conditions, 
requirements, and limitations of the context of the discourse (Situation).  In law and 
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker’s purpose is most closely aligned with 
the canon of Efficiency, the Message to achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the 
language of Incentives and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience 
according to the Rational Choice Theory, and the means used are chosen in 
reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct preference for the methods of 
Mathematics and Science.  Therefore, I will realign the rhetorical diamond of the 
canons of law and economics by depicting the flow of the discourse wherein each 
canon feeds into and simultaneously draws from the other canons in alignment with 
the components of modern argument theory: 
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DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
INVENTION, 
ARRANGEMENT 
& STYLE 
 
SPEAKER 
INVENTION, 
ARRANGEMENT 
& STYLE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SITUATION 
  
 
 
 
 
 
MESSAGE 
INVENTION, 
ARRANGEMENT 
& STYLE 
 
AUDIENCE 
INVENTION, 
ARRANGEMENT 
& STYLE 
 
 
 The diagram indicates the rhetorical modes I will discuss in Section III:   
 
A.  Mathematics and Science used as Topics of Invention and 
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style.  
 
B. Incentives and Costs used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and 
as a Trope of Style. 
 
C.  Efficiency used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and as a Trope 
of Style. 
 
D. Rational Choice used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and as a 
Trope of Style. 
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III. The Canons of Law and Economics as Rhetorical 
Perspectives in Law 
 
A. Rhetoric-1-2-3 uses of Mathematics and Science as Topics of Invention 
and Arrangement and a Trope of Style 
 
Rhetoric under the modern argument theory of contemporary rhetorical 
theory is crafting discourse for the audience and the situation.134  Modern argument 
theory confronts the problem of the indeterminacy of language.135  The linguistic 
limitations of indeterminacy mean that arguments are not provable in the absolute 
unless the language used, such as the language of mathematics and formal logic, is 
determinate enough for absolute proof, at least “proof” within the language of that 
discipline.136  Outside the realms of mathematics and formal logic, language is only 
determinative of probabilities of meaning, so that when the discourse extends 
beyond pure mathematics and formal logic, argumentation depends on the 
construction of the most reasonable and probable argument that can be made in the 
social situation or institutional setting.137  The argument is not offered as 
                                                 
 
134 See generally Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, supra n.19;  Bitzer, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; 
Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8; Toulmin, supra n.19; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80. 
 
135 See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Bruner & Amsterdam, supra n.8, at chs. 2-3, 6-7; 
Frans H. Van Eemeren et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Stephen Toulmin et al., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning]; Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8. 
 
136 See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning, supra n.140;  
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8. 
 
137 See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning, supra n.140;  
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8. 
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incontrovertible proof, but instead as the most reasonable and probable outcome 
that can be advocated in the situation.138 
Invention and arrangement are the canons that directly confront the 
rhetorical problem of composing the language for a meaning and persuasion by the 
audience in the situation: 
Invention:  Invention is the canon that describes the means to create, devise, 
and conceive of persuasive discourse.139 The term invention is a translation of the 
Latin inventio and carries the same meaning as the Greek term for invention or 
discovery, heuristic (Ευρετική).140 The canon is divided into two parts, the modes of 
argument and persuasion that are invented or created by the author—the entechnic 
pisteis or “artistic” or “artificial” proofs known as logos, pathos, and ethos141—and 
the modes of argument and persuasion that the author does not or cannot invent, 
but that are discovered or found—the atechnic pisteis or “non-artistic” or “non-
artificial” proofs, including facts and data, statistics and reports, documents and 
                                                 
138 See generally Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8; Toulmin, supra n.140.  In the legal 
arena, this theory accepts that fact that the advocate has a client whose facts and legal situation are 
not necessarily the best possible circumstances for a person legally to be involved in; nevertheless, 
the advocate must offer the most reasonable, probable, and compelling argument in support of his or 
her client's position that can be raised in the situation, with the hope that the decision-maker will 
find the argument more reasonable and compelling than the opponent's arguments.  Smith, Rhetoric 
Theory, supra n.8, at 139 (citing Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. 
LEG. EDUC. 566, 567 (1994)). 
 
139 Frost, Lost Heritage, at 617; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of 
Invention, 66 St. John’s L. Rev. 107, 110 (1992) [Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis].  
 
140 See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 48; http://howtosay.org/en_el/Heuristic (last accessed 
Jan. 2, 2011).  “Heureka,” a/k/a, “eureka” is, “I have found (it),” the first person, singular, perfect 
active indicative form of heuriskein, the Greek verb “to find.” See http://wordinfo.info/unit/ 
781?letter=E&spage=6 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011). 
 
141 See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, Introduction to Logos, Pathos, and Ethos, in Advanced Legal Writing, 
supra n.12, at 10-25. 
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contracts, sworn testimony (including expert testimony), interviews, polls, and 
surveys.142   
The canon of invention serves as a reminder to authors of legal discourse to 
consider the available means of persuasion and the interaction of the modes chosen 
so as not to leave out available means or employ self-contradictory or self-defeating 
means.  The classical rhetoricians did not consider this canon to be a list of required 
elements of argument.143  Ideally, using the classical rhetorical canon of invention, 
the discourse should be crafted to persuade through logos,144 a logical exposition of 
the argument, as well as by revealing the competence and integrity of the author to 
handle the exposition itself (ethos),145 and inspire emotions that put the audience in 
a frame of mind to be persuaded by the argument (pathos),146 by using the non-
artificial facts and evidence made available by the rhetorical situation. 
Classical rhetoric follows three paths simultaneously toward the goal of 
persuasion: ethos (persuasion accomplished through the perceived character or 
reputation of the speaker),147 pathos (persuasion accomplished through the 
                                                 
142 See Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley, 
RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011. 
 
143 See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133, 
at 127. 
 
144 See Smith, Aristotle's Logic, supra n.133. 
 
145 Covino & Joliffe, supra n.16, at 52; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 71-77; Kennedy, Classical 
Rhetoric, supra n.54, at 68, 75. 
 
146 Covino & Joliffe supra n.16, at 17; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 77-84; Kennedy, Classical 
Rhetoric, supra n.54, at 82, 89. 
 
147 Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356. 
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emotional response of the audience to the communication),148 and logos (persuasion 
accomplished through logical reasoning embodied in the content of the 
communication).149  The interaction of the three means of persuasion may be 
depicted as a “rhetorical triangle” similar to the “communication triangle” discussed 
in contemporary rhetorical theory150 (see diagram below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this conceptualization, the three paths of persuasion flow into one another:  
the logos of the argument affects the pathos in the audience and simultaneously 
affects the perception of the ethos of the author; the pathos of the audience 
members affects how they perceive the ethos of the author and how they receive the 
logos of the argument. 
                                                 
 
148 Id. 
 
149 Id. 
 
150 Univ. of Iowa Rhetoric Dep’t, The Rhetorical Triangle: Logos, Ethos and Pathos, MORPHING 
TEXTBOOK~RHETORIC TOOLS at http://www.uiowa.edu/~rhetoric/morphing_textbook/ 
general/triangle.html (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010); see also Levine & Saunders, supra n.19, at 114-
15; Kinneavy, Theory of Discourse, supra n.135, at 19; Phelps, supra n.9, at 1091-93. 
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Arrangement:  The classical rhetorical canon of arrangement (Latin 
dispositio; Greek taxis) pertains to the order and design of the discourse for 
persuasive effect.151  Arrangement is context and purpose driven—the proper and 
persuasive arrangement of discourse depends on the speaker, the speaker’s purpose, 
the setting or situation, the characteristics of the speaker’s audience, and the 
audience’s purpose, desires, or motivation.152  As a starting point, the classical 
rhetoricians developed a complex paradigm for arguments that still is applied in 
court rules153 for trial and appellate briefs: Exordium (introduction or statement of 
the issues presented), Narratio (statement of the case), Partitio (summary of the 
argument), Confirmatio (argument), and Peroratio (conclusion).154 
As with the other canons of rhetoric, arrangement was considered to be of 
high importance to the persuasiveness of the discourse.  Sloppy, disorderly, or 
impenetrable arrangements defeat access to the demonstration of the workings of 
the argument, deny falsifiability, distract the audience’s attention from the 
                                                 
151 See Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 256-92; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50; 
Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-19; Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 182-
89. 
 
152 See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 256-92; 
Michael H. Frost, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC 4, 34, 35 (2005) [Frost, Classical 
Legal Rhetoric]. 
 
153 E.g., U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules 14, 24; see Frost, Classical Legal Rhetoric, supra n.157, at 45; 
Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50. 
 
154 See Frost, Classical Legal Rhetoric, supra n.157, at 45.  The dispositio of the argument also may 
contain refutatio, the making and meeting of counter-arguments.  In De Inventione, Cicero named 
six parts: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio (refutation, counter-argumentation), 
and conclusio (conclusion).  Cicero, De Inventione, supra n.18, at 1.19.  The Rhetorica ad Herennium 
names six parts of dispositio: exordium, narratio, divisio (summary, breakdown of arguments), 
confirmatio, confutatio (counter-argumentation), and conclusio.  RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM § 1.3 (H. 
Caplan trans., Harv. U. Press 1954).  See Russ VerSteeg & Nina Barclay, Rhetoric and Law in Ovid's 
Orpheus, 15 L. & LIT. 395, 409-10 & n.71, 413 (2003). 
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communication of the discourse, and deflate the audience’s reception and reaction to 
the argument.  All of this prevents persuasion. 
 1. The entechnic pisteis (artistic) modes of Logos in Mathematical 
and Scientific methods of Invention and Arrangement 
 
Mathematics and science already tread the logos pathway to persuasive 
discourse through the logical deductive structure of the syllogism155 and the logical 
inductive structure of the induction.156  The same forms may be used in invention 
and arrangement in rhetoric to construct meaning and respond to the expectations 
of the legal writing discourse community.157 
                                                 
155 Deductive reasoning is the process of formation of a major premise or general proposition and 
moving to the analysis of a minor premise or specific proposition so as to draw a conclusion. Frost, 
Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 118; Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra n.56, at 492-93 
(2003); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation–Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of 
Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1993).  Aristotle characterized all forms of 
deductive reasoning as belonging to the topic of syllogisms. See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, 
at Book I, ch. 1 at 1356.  In a legal argument, a legal rule—a statement of the legal principles that 
govern a general set of circumstances—is applied to a new situation—a specific set of facts—to 
produce a conclusion about the outcome of this application.  Murray & DeSanctis, supra n.56, at 8-9. 
 
156 The process of induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its relationship to a 
number of other specific propositions that are known to be true.  A certain genus of situations with 
identifiable characteristics can be defined from a synthesis of known situations (“species” of 
situations, or “precedents”) that all share these characteristics.  See Rapp, supra n.53, at §§ 5(C), 7.4.  
Aristotle called a rhetorical induction an “example.” Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, 
ch. 2 at 1356b; Scharffs, supra n.53, at 752 & n.58; Schmidt, supra n.53, at 372-73. 
 
157 The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal discourse and rhetoric 
derived from the classical tradition, in which there are two permitted logical structures for an 
argument, the deductive and the inductive.  Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 1 at 
1355a; Cicero, De Inventione, supra n.18, at 93; Quintilian, supra n.18 at 273.  The forms for 
effective legal discourse, as opposed to mathematical, scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic 
rhetorical form known as an enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an example or 
paradigm argument.  Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.  See also George 
A. Kennedy, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 40 & n. 49 (1991) (“Kennedy, 
On Rhetoric”).  Aristotle believed the enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms.  Aristotle, The 
Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.  
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The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms)158 and the induction and 
example (inductive forms)159 are topoi of arrangement in science, mathematics, and 
rhetorical demonstration.160  By borrowing the structure of mathematics and 
science, legal discourse can engage in open demonstration of the reasoning process 
                                                 
158 In the deductive structure, both syllogisms and enthymemes begin with a major premise and 
follow with a minor premise so as to produce a conclusion.  The difference between the two forms is 
that in a true syllogism each major premise must be a true statement of absolute certainty, and the 
minor premise also must be a true statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is 
absolutely, irrefutably true. Corbett & Connors, supra note 4 at 38-48.  This is referred to by 
Aristotle as a “complete proof.” Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1357.  In an 
enthymeme, the major premise, whether it be explicitly stated or implied in the enthymeme, must be 
most probably true. Corbett & Connors, supra note 4 at 53 (quoting Aristotle, THE LOGIC: PRIOR 
ANALYTICS, Book II, ch. 27); Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 4 at 635-36; Michael Frost, Justice 
Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: a Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L. 
J. 167, 168 n. 6 (2002) (Frost, Scalia’s Rhetoric); Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The 
Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. L. WRITING 61, 77, 80, 81-84 (2001-2002).  In other words, truth 
with absolute certainty is not required, only probability of truth. Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 
53-54.  Similarly, the minor premise must be most probably true, not absolutely, necessarily true. 
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 53-54. Corbett and Connor’s definition of enthymeme in the 
Aristotelian sense is more appropriate for the evaluation of legal discourse than the more limited 
definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism where one of the premises, usually the major 
premise, is implicit and unstated.  Accord, Eugene E. Ryan, ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF RHETORICAL 
ARGUMENTATION 29-34, 36, 38-41 (1984); James A. Gardner, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND 
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4-5, 8, 37-38 (1993).  As these authors point out, the implicit 
major premise is one potential aspect of an enthymeme that would differentiate it from a true 
syllogism, but it is not a requirement of every enthymeme.  This produces a conclusion that also is 
most probably true; but this is acceptable because the enthymeme’s purpose is to persuade, not to 
establish or define a proposition as a matter of scientific proof. Id. at 53.  See Frost, Greco-Roman 
Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 110. 
 
159 In daily life, and particularly in the law, a rhetorician infrequently can state an induction with as 
much certainty as the above example.  Aristotle anticipates this when he differentiates a rhetorical 
induction (an “example”) from a true induction. See Scharffs, supra n.53, at 752 & n. 58.  In an 
example, as in an enthymeme, the propositions induced by a representative sampling of species of 
situations (cases or precedents) are asserted to be true to a high degree of probability, not certainty. 
See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b, Book II, ch. 19 at 1392a-1392b. 
 
160 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the 
structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See Aristotle, The 
Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, Ch. 1, at 1355a.   In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of 
the applicable legal principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the specific 
circumstances of the case at hand, so as to describe a highly probable conclusion or prediction about 
the application. Id. at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a.  
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in a form that is recognized as authoritative and persuasive.161  The structure of the 
argument takes the form of logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove the 
proposition.162  Focusing on the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 uses of mathematical 
forms and structure, this structure of argumentation is readily identifiable by 
audiences, and communicates a proper logical structure to support the discourse 
(rhetoric-2) as well as demonstrating internally consistent work of a competent 
author (rhetoric-3). 
Induction can inform the major premise of the deductive structure—the 
process of development of the rules or standards through the process of rule 
synthesis163 and explanatory synthesis.164  The deductive structure of the syllogism 
                                                 
161 See Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27,  
at 3, 4; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59; 
 
162 George Pólya, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF MATHEMATICS AND 
PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752, 
760.  The pros and cons of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is 
growing in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009-10.  E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith versus 
Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 
445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010). 
 
163 Rule synthesis is a synthesis of authorities found to be on point and controlling of a legal question 
in order to accurately determine and state the prevailing law—the rules—that govern a legal issue.  
Authorities that control the disposition of a legal issue must be reconciled for their explicit 
statements and pronouncements of the governing legal standards  as well as examined for implicit 
requirements that are induced from the controlling authorities. See, e.g., Helene S. Shapo, Elizabeth 
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999); 
Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND 
WRITING chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 2007); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 
chs. 10-13 (5th ed. 2005); Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? 
Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (2002).  Legal analysis employs 
synthesis of the rules to make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles that 
govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the “R” (Rule) section of the discourse, or the first 
half of the major premise of the legal reasoning syllogism.  Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and 
Analysis, supra n.56, chs. 2, 5, 6. 
 
164 Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a separate process of induction of 
principles of interpretation and application concerning the prevailing rules governing a legal issue. 
The induction is from samples—namely case law—representing specific situations with concrete 
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and enthymeme provides the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of 
legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT.165 The rhetorical logos 
structures of law and economics are a highly recommended form for persuasive 
discourse under modern argument theory and the contemporary rhetoric theory of 
discourse communities.166  This use of mathematical structure creates meaning and 
communicates persuasive discourse to each possible audience through level 1, 2, 
and 3 rhetoric. 
2. The atechnic pisteis or (non-artistic) modes of Invention and 
Arrangement of Mathematics and Science 
 
Mathematics and science plays a direct role in contemporary legal analysis of 
facts and data, statistics and reports, documents and contracts, sworn testimony 
(including expert testimony), interviews, polls, and surveys—in short, we have come 
a long way in the proper presentation of the atechnic pisteis or (non-artistic) modes 
                                                                                                                                                             
facts and in which the legal rules have been applied to produce a concrete outcome.  While rule 
synthesis is the component of legal analysis that determines what legal standards apply to and 
control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to demonstrate and communicate how these legal 
standards work in various situations relevant to the legal issue at hand. See Murray & DeSanctis, 
Legal Writing and Analysis, chs. 6, 7 (discussing explanatory synthesis); Michael D. Murray, Rule 
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 Leg. Com. 
& Rhet. ___ (2011) [Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis] (forthcoming). 
 
165 Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis, chs. 2, 6, 7 (discussing IRAC and TREAT);  
Linda H. Edwards, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th 
ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse); Robbins, 
Paradigm Lost 484-87, 492 (discussing IRAC and IREAC); Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory 
Synthesis, supra n.169; James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal 
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006) 
(discussing IRAC and IREAC). 
 
166 The legal writing discourse community has an expectation that the syllogistic structures of IRAC, 
IREAC, or TREAT will be employed, thus the rhetorical lesson is not to disappoint this audience 
with a non-syllogistic structure.  See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, 
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is “Logic” 
Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEG. 
EDUC. 157, 164-77 (1997). 
 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 57 of 83 
 
of invention.  In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and 
securities law, and the calculation of damages in almost every area of contract, tort 
and property law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive 
element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or 
damages.  In addition, at a second level of rhetoric, the use of scientific and 
mathematical tools as topoi for persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of 
elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of 
empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant tabular 
presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion.  In both 
categories, the direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive 
ordering and presentation of evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed as 
a language to convince the reader of the evidence or proof of the proposition, and 
thus is rhetorical.167   
The use of such methods of persuasion has grown over the years168: 
 
                                                 
167 See Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley, 
RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011. 
 
168 Westlaw search “SHOWN DEPICT! DISPLAY! PICTURED REFER! /4 FIGURE GRAPH! CHART 
TABULAR” with date restrictions for each decade, e.g., date(>1999) & date(<2010), in ALLCASES 
and JLR databases. 
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This chart reports a single search in each decade for figures, charts, graphics, and 
tabular material, and there is no simple way to control for uses that are proof of 
elements (such as damages) or ordering of data and information for persuasion (e.g., 
evidence).  But the point of the chart is that whatever uses are made of figures, 
chart, graph, or table, the uses are going up in cases and law reviews in each 
decade, and markedly so in the last two decades in law review and journal articles. 
The substantive use of mathematical forms to create meaning and 
communicate understanding is the topic in this section.  The more artistic and 
stylistic use of mathematical forms is discussed in the next section. 
  3. Rhetoric-3 uses of Mathematics and Science as a Trope of Style  
 Style (Latin elocutio;  Greek lexis) pertains to the composition and wording of 
the discourse, including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech.169  Figures of 
                                                 
 
169 See generally Smith, supra n.8, at 133-34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in classical rhetoric); 
Corbett and Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 378. 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 59 of 83 
 
speech were divided into schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary 
arrangements of words), and tropes (creative variations on the meanings of 
words).170  Style is dependent on the speaker, the context and setting, and the 
audience, and the classical rhetoricians made recommendations for dividing 
discourse into one of three levels of style:  the low or plain style (Latin infinum or 
humile; Greek ischnos) whose purpose is to teach the audience, the middle style 
(Latin aequabile or mediocre; Greek mesos) whose purpose is to please the 
audience, and the grand style (Latin supra or magniloquens; Greek adros) whose 
purpose is to move the audience.171 
 The audience and the situation for the discourse are, of course, very 
important to the analysis of the best arguments that can be raised,172 so modern 
argument theory calls for advocates to pay particular attention to the audience and 
situation of their argument.173   
 Mathematical forms (charts, diagrams, four-quadrant tables, algebraic 
formulas) can stimulate thought and imagination, leading to rhetoric-3 appreciation 
of the persuasiveness of the discourse.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
170 Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 51 & n.179. 
 
171 See generally Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Frost, Greco Roman Legal Analysis, 
supra n.133, at 188-89;  
 
172 Bitzer, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 675-80. 
 
173 Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139. 
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Example 1174: 
 
 This chart is intended to report “Ratings Of Challenges Facing Successful 
Operations Of A Business In Russia (Among Selected Major Brandholders And 
Trademark Owners Doing Business In Russia),” and it is offered to demonstrate 
that intellectual property protection is perceived to be a primary challenge 
confronting international companies doing business in Russia.175  The author 
describes the methodology in the following way:  “In the survey, respondents were 
asked to rate a series of ‘challenges confronting the successful operations of your 
business in Russia’ using a five-point scale, where one meant ‘least important’ and 
five meant ‘most important.’  More than one-half (52%) of selected major 
brandholders and trademark owners doing business in Russia gave a rating of five 
to intellectual property protection.  This ranks intellectual property protection on 
virtually the same high level of concern as customs (54%) and taxes (52%) — which 
                                                 
174 Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights, <http://www.cipr.org/activities/surveys/top50/ 
index.htm> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
 
175 Id. 
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have historically been perceived as presenting the greatest challenges to business 
success in Russia.”176   
Nothing in this chart is particularly mathematical except the fact that the 
author crunched some numbers to produce the chart, but the demonstration of the 
data in a bar graph with a super-imposed variable line graph makes the 
presentation all the more authoritative in a rhetoric-3 sense because it appears that 
a complicated mathematical formula was applied to data to produce this graph. 
Example 2177: 
 
                                                 
176 Id. 
 
177 H. Taylor Buckner, Ph.D., Concordia's "Gun Control" Petition: Ignorance of the Law is the Only 
Excuse, http://www.tbuckner.com/IGNOLAW.HTM (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
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 I consider example 2 to be an excellent use of scientific charting (taking the 
form of an informational or decisional flow chart) to make a rhetorical-3 point: the 
procedure for acquiring a firearm in Quebec is too complicated. 
Example 3178: 
 
 
 
 This chart discusses the rise and fall of city names in English language 
literature, and claims that this Google Lab chart reports the results of a search of 
city names in the vast amount of literature that Google has scanned and compiled 
for searching.179  The chart purports to tell us something about “the relative 
                                                 
178 Android6 blog, The Fall and Rise of Twitter in English Literature, < http://android6.net/the-fall-
and-rise-of-twitter-in-english-literature/> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
 
179 Id. 
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importance of different power centers in the public imagination.”180  The author 
could have stated (in plain English): when searching for “Paris, London, New York, 
Boston and Rome,” in the scanned English literature from 1750 to 2008, interest in 
London remained steady and at a higher level than Paris, Boston, and Rome, while 
interest in New York started at very low point but grew steadily, surpassing London 
in approximately 1910, and continued to rise in popularity until 1980, when it 
began a steady decline.”  This would have accurately stated the purported findings, 
but the graphing of the information sends a very different rhetoric-3 message—that 
something scientific was done, and produced the results the readers see before 
them. 
 Mathematical forms are a persuasive tool, but the tool is only as good as the 
user, and the user must be careful about proper uses in proper situations.  In 
general legal discourse, the use of law and economics mathematical and scientific 
forms and schemes as an artistic or stylistic mode comes with a word of caution that 
is grounded in the very discipline from which the rhetorical use of such forms is 
drawn:  Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical 
primacy of scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, 
designing the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, 
and information collected to test the hypotheses.181  Law and economics also 
                                                 
180 Id. 
 
181 See Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 15-16; 
Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies--An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 
437, 437 (1972).  See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, 
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 
(1998); Gary Minda, supra n.52, at 611-12. 
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assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to 
openly demonstrate the analyses and reveal its theses about human behavior for 
examination and critique.182  The rhetorical power of a mathematical proof or a 
demonstration of a scientific deduction or induction lies is the openness and 
transparency of the demonstration.  The premises (major and minor) and the nature 
of the hypothesis induced from the comparison of genus and species of data must be 
fully disclosed and described so as to allow the presentation to be analyzed and 
rebutted.  The assertions made in reference to the information displayed must be 
falsifiable; tautological explication (the information is what it is) adds nothing to 
meaning or understanding, and does not contribute to the mode of persuasion that 
points to truth.  At worst, using mathematical forms simply to dazzle or confuse the 
audience or obfuscate the relevant information pertinent to the issue is the worst 
form of trickery (mere rhetoric, not actual rhetoric). Consider the following chart of 
the Obama Health Care Reform initiative183: 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
182 See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980). 
 
183 Paul Ibrahim, Politics, Economics, and More blog, <http://www.paulibrahim.com/blog/2009/7/16/ 
get-well-soon-health-care-bureaucracy-chart.html> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
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I may be wrong, but I don’t think the intention of the author of this chart was to 
make clear the available options offered under the health care reform initiative. 
 B.  Rhetorical Lessons in Defining Legal Phenomena as Incentives and Costs  
 This section will discuss:  (1) rhetoric-3 uses of incentives and costs as a trope 
of style (i.e., a figure of speech using incentives and costs as a metaphor in 
discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 concept of incentives and costs in 
the organization and presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention and 
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse and whether it 
creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader). 
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 1. Incentives and Costs as a Rhetoric-3  Trope of Style 
 Economics and behavioral science informs legal discourse and communication 
by pointing out that people respond to incentives.  Contemporary law and 
economics, informed by the lessons of behavioral science, offers a rhetorical 
perspective on legal discourse and communication because the study of persuasion 
in legal communication involves an analysis of what an author (speaker, writer, 
communicator) can do to create incentives to attract or motivate the reader 
(listener, etc.) while avoiding imposing costs on the reader. 
 A trope is “a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a 
word.”184  Metaphor is a trope of style in rhetoric, one of the figures of speech 
described and applied within the canon of style.185  Metaphor is one of the “master 
tropes,” the others being metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.186  Numerous 
disciplines have studied the power of metaphor in discourse, including linguistics, 
                                                 
184 Edward P.J. Corbett, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 461 (1971). 
 
185 Professor Stephanie A. Gore, in “A Rose By Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors For New 
Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 404-05 (2003), defines a metaphor as follows: “A 
‘metaphor’ is defined as a ‘figure of speech in which a word or phrase that ordinarily designates one 
thing is used to designate another, thus making an implicit comparison.’ THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). A metaphor may also be defined as ‘an 
implied analogy imaginatively identifying one object with another and ascribing to the first object 
one or more of the qualities of the second.’ C. Hugh Holman & William Harmon, A HANDBOOK TO 
LITERATURE 298 (5th ed. 1986). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics elegantly defines 
metaphor as ‘[a] condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by the presence 
of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be enhanced in vividness, complexity, or breadth of 
implication.’ PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 490 (Ales Preminger ed., enlarged 
ed., 1974).” 
 
186 Burke, Grammar of Motives, supra n.19, at Appx. D.  Burke described the master tropes as 
follows: For metaphor we could substitute perspective; For metonymy we could substitute reduction; 
For synecdoche we could substitute representation; For irony we could substitute dialectic. Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
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philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and literary theory.187 Recent literary 
and cognitive studies of metaphor188 have shown that:  
 Literary analysis and cognitive psychology theory analyze the use and effect 
of metaphors in ways that resemble the techniques of their Greco-Roman 
counterparts. In some recent discussions of metaphors' place in legal 
discourse, analysts reject the view that metaphors are merely superficial 
stylistic devices. They assert, with Haig Bosmajian, that “it is now well 
established that the tropes, especially the metaphor, are not simply rhetorical 
flourishes used to embellish discourse.”189 Instead, these analysts maintain 
that metaphors are essential devices for achieving certain sorts of intellectual 
insights.  Classical rhetoricians' recognized that metaphors provide insights 
or “fresh knowledge”190 that can “scarcely be conveyed”191 by other means. 
                                                 
187 Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 919-
20 (2007) (citing Linguistics sources: George Lakoff, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with Mark 
Johnson); George Lakoff, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT 
THE MIND (1987); George Lakoff, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 
(1989) (with Mark Turner); George Lakoff, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES 
THINK (1996); George Lakoff, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO 
WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark Johnson); George Lakoff, "DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: 
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE” THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); 
George Lakoff, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND VISION (2006); 
Philosophy sources: Mark Johnson, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with George Lakoff); Mark 
Johnson, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR (Mark Johnson ed., 1981); Mark Johnson, THE 
BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); Mark Johnson, 
MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1993); Mark Johnson, 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) 
(with George Lakoff); Rhetoric sources: Michael H. Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric 
Reasoning, in INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005); Michael R. 
Smith, The Power of Metaphor and Simile in Persuasive Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: 
THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 179, 179 (1st ed. 2002); Cognitive psychology 
sources: Steven L. Winter, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Steven L. 
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 
(1988); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative 
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric 
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989); and Literary Theory 
sources: Michael R. Smith, The Functions of Literary References in Persuasive Writing: A 
Multidisciplinary Analysis, in Advanced Legal Writing, supra n.12, at 9, 15-30 (discussing “Literary 
References for Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison”). 
 
188 E.g., Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 L. WRITING 113, 135-38 
(1996) [Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor]. 
 
189 Id. (citing Haig Bosmajian, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 441 (1992).  See also 
Haig Bosmajian, “The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First 
Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers,” 444 J.L. & EDUC. 443 (1986)). 
 
190 Id. (citing Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at 206). 
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Under this view, metaphors become important intellectual components of 
legal analysis rather than mere mnemonic or focusing devices.192 
 
Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo warned that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly 
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it.”193  
The rhetorical path that uses incentives and costs as a metaphor for 
conditions and effects in the law is a well-traveled path in legal discourse.194  Every 
time an author writes about a cost-benefit analysis, the use of the term “cost” 
stands in as a metaphor, a rhetorical trope that attempts to transfer the concept of 
a cost onto to the understanding of the actual action or condition described.  The 
word “benefit” similarly stands in to communicate a beneficial meaning to the 
reader concerning the actual effect or change in condition discussed in the 
discourse.  Every time a change in the law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct, 
the concept of “incentive” is a metaphor for the intention of the actor to motivate a 
certain reaction by offering something desired by the recipient.  Every time a license 
or permit application process is said to provide a “disincentive” to an activity, the 
term “disincentive” is used to convey the negative effects of the condition described 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
191 Id. (citing Cicero, De Oratore, supra n.18, at 123). 
 
192 Id.  at 135-37. 
 
193 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).  Thus, Judge 
Cardozo used a metaphor (liberation or enslavement of thought) to criticize the use of metaphors in 
law. 
 
194 Note the metaphor I am using here.  Metaphors are unavoidable in legal discourse. 
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in the discourse.  Every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an 
“externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses “externality” as a figure of 
speech to suggest that the law imposes a “cost” that is not internalized by one or 
more of the parties in the discussion.  This is in fact a metaphor within a 
metaphor—both “cost” and “internalize” are used metaphorically in this example.  
By using the terms “incentives” and “costs” metaphorically, legal authors can 
discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not 
necessarily business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of 
pecuniary sums or damages.195 This expansion in language may improve 
communication—the enlightening aspect of metaphor in discourse.  Of course, with 
regard to proper ethos, the recommendation to use metaphor in rhetoric-3 
applications comes with Judge Cardozo’s highly metaphorical warning not to let the 
metaphor enslave the reader’s thinking on the topic. 
2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 incentives and costs of organization 
and presentation of the discourse as topics of invention and 
arrangement  
 
The economic rhetorical use of incentives and costs also has rhetoric-2 and 
rhetoric-3 application in the organization and presentation of the discourse as topics 
                                                 
195 In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the 
calculation of damages in almost every area of law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the 
substantive element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages.  
In addition, at the level rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for 
persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical 
and quantitative analyses of empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant 
tabular presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion.  In both categories, the 
direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of 
evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language to convince the reader of the 
evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is rhetorical.  See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, Thinking 
Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 
(1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011. 
 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 70 of 83 
 
of invention and arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse 
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).  Contemporary 
law and economics informs contemporary rhetorical studies of invention, 
arrangement, and style adding to the knowledge-base of studies of writing as a 
process and discourse community theory.  The rhetorical perspective of economics 
and behavioral science informs the study and understanding of effective legal 
communication by demonstrating the means by which an author can create 
incentives to attract or motivate the reader while avoiding imposing costs on the 
reader.  As one example, incentives can be created in legal communication and 
transaction costs can be avoided in legal communication by compositional choices 
made by the author through the use of a helpful, reader-oriented organizational 
paradigm such as the TREAT paradigm.196 Incentives can be created and costs can 
be avoided in legal communication by organization of the contents of 
communications into rule formation (rule section) and separate explanation of how 
the rule works (explanation section).197  Incentives can be created and costs can be 
imposed in legal communication by the method of syntheses of authorities used to 
demonstrate both the legal rules that govern the issue and how those legal rules 
work in actual, concrete situations by the use of explanatory synthesis.198 
 
 
                                                 
196 Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra n.56, at ch. 6. 
 
197 Id. 
  
198 See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra n.169. 
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 C.  Rhetorical Use of Efficiency in Legal Discourse 
 As specifically applied to the rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, 
and style, the rhetorical perspective of economics and behavioral science can inform 
the discussion by demonstrating that efficiency supports the persuasiveness of legal 
discourse.  
1. Rhetoric-3 use of Efficiency in Invention and Creation of 
Meaning 
 
Economic or productive efficiency is the application of the term “efficiency” 
that is best known to non-economists.  The advice for legal authors seeking 
rhetoric-3 recognition of the meaning of the term when used outside of strict 
economic analysis is to use the term “efficiency” or “efficient” to refer to an 
avoidance of waste, a reduction in costs (transaction costs, collateral costs, or 
externalities), or other savings in time or money that have been or would be brought 
about by a change in the law.  Saving money or time is nearly universally valued as 
a goal in life and in the law.  Emphasis of efficiency—the phrasing and defining of 
elements of the circumstance in terms of efficiency in the time or cost saving 
sense—is rhetorically valuable.   
 2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 Efficiency in Arrangement and Style   
Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the form, structure, 
and composition of economic discourse.  This lesson from the canons of law and 
economics teaches legal authors to follow a prescription to make their discourse 
clear, concise, succinct, and elegant in form.  The formal use of the term efficiency 
benefits clarity and promotes comprehension of meaning over confusion and 
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frustration.  It opens doors to falsifiability because the material is more accessible 
for analysis and criticism if it is clear and succinct.  The door to falsifiability is 
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation in legal discourse.  
Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted are highly persuasive.   
  
D.  Rhetorical Lessons from Contemporary Rational Choice Theory 
 The lessons for rhetorical discourse using the definition of rational choice in 
contemporary law and economics have become more complicated as our 
understanding of human behavior grows, but the consequences of the contemporary 
theories of rational choice ultimately coincide with lessons learned from classical 
rhetoric and modern studies of cognition and brain science.  I will discuss the 
rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice theory in three areas:  
(1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to respond to biases and heuristics and to 
situational conditions on rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement; 
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and syllogistic 
structure) to appeal to the rational audience; and (3) rhetoric-3 uses of pathos-
centric modes of argument—metaphor, parable/mythical/fable forms, character 
archetypes, and other forms of narrative reasoning—as topics of invention and 
tropes of style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other heuristics and 
biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from modern cognitive 
studies and brain science. 
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1.   The Rhetoric-1 importance of framing in Invention and 
Arrangement 
 
 It is challenging to manage the modeling and framing of broad concepts such 
as fairness and justice in economic theory, but the rhetorical implications of the 
empirical observations in law and economics, cognitive studies, and brain science 
reveal that people respond to justice and fairness in legal discourse.  These studies 
confirm what has been predicted by the advocates of the modes of persuasion of 
logos, ethos, and pathos.  Arguments framed from a more general perspective of how 
the law and the public policy behind the law supports the argument are of course a 
necessary part of legal discourse, and a legal author does not need law and 
economics to tell her that. 
 Other theories developed through empirical testing of rational choice biases 
and heuristics with a predictable effect on decision-making, such as the endowment 
effect, the status quo bias, and risk/loss aversion, can be used to frame arguments.  
For example, if an author combines two lessons from the experiments of behavioral 
science—the experiments indicating that framing of choice matters because decision 
making is context based,199 and the experiments indicating that the endowment 
effect or status quo bias plays a strong role in contract negotiation200—creates a 
rhetorical prescription for advocates:  advocates should work to carefully and 
advantageously define the starting point terms of a negotiation (which will, as 
                                                 
199 Cass R. Sunstein, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 4, 5 (2000) [Sunstein, Behavioral Law & 
Economics]; Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal 
Decision Making, in Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics, supra at 61-62, 73-74, 76. 
 
200 Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in Sunstein, Behavioral Law and 
Economics, supra n.204, at 116-119, 120-121, 136-138. 
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indicated by the experiments, be perceived and responded to as the status quo)201 or 
the status of the current law from which the tribunal must move forward to 
adjudicate the client’s matter (which, again, will be perceived as the status quo),202 
and simultaneously work to frame the choices of departure in such a way that the 
preferred outcome for a client is framed as an appropriate compromise choice—not 
the most extreme or most expensive departure from the status quo starting 
positions (as defined by the advocate), but not the smallest departure either.203 
 2. Rhetoric-1 and Rhetoric-2 Logos Topics of Arrangement and 
Invention (Inductive Synthesis and Syllogistic Structures) for 
the Rational Audience (the Legal Writing Discourse 
Community) 
 
 The overall structure of legal discourse, both in terms of invention and 
arrangement, should be drafted with regard to the logos topics of syllogistic 
structure and inductive synthesis.  The rhetoric-1 audience of legal discourse is law 
trained readers—the legal writing discourse community.  The expectations of this 
group manifestly support using a logical syllogistic structure for the overall 
architecture of the discourse, and the Anglo-American theory of precedent and stare 
decisis support the inductive structure of a synthesis of authorities to determine the 
legal standards governing an issue.  The lessons of modern cognitive studies and 
brain science that challenge many of the assumptions, premises, and paradigms of 
traditional rational choice theory in law and economics do not wipe the slate clean 
                                                 
 
201 See Korobkin, supra n.205, at 136. 
 
202 Id. at 137. 
 
203Kelman, Rottenstreich, & Tversky, supra n.205, at 74-76. 
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from the expectations of the legal writing discourse community and its basic 
conventions for organization and demonstration.  Even if indirect audiences are 
contemplated, in rhetoric-2 persuasion, the logical syllogistic structure is a widely 
accepted method of demonstration.  If used properly with appropriate attention to 
the ethos of the discussion, the structure opens up the premises and evidence of the 
discussion to examination and potential criticism or rebuttal.  A proper synthesis 
identifies the species that are examined as well as the newly identified genus 
principles that are induced from the species, or it identifies the existing genus 
principles that are applied to the newly identified species of the genus depending on 
which side of the induction the discussion falls.  In short, in invention and 
arrangement, there is no ready substitute for the logical syllogistic structure of legal 
discourse and the inductive structure of synthesis.   
 3. Rhetoric-3 Rational Choice Lessons concerning Pathos-Based 
Modes of Persuasion to Address Cognitive and Situational 
Effects on Decision-making 
 
 A significant part of contemporary law and economics’ rational choice theory 
is under examination to challenge the assertion that legal decision-makers are 
autonomous individuals weighing costs and benefits in individualistic terms, 
unaffected by context and situation.  Under the traditional and still prevailing 
doctrine of rational choice, rational decision-making should not be affected by 
situation, meaning that choices that maximize the decision-makers’ ends should not 
be affected by situation.  The values and interests implicated by a choice may be 
different from individual to individual, but once identified, the choices made in 
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recognition of the same values and interests should not change from situation to 
situation.  Cognitive studies and brain science on situational decision-making take 
the opposite tack based on empirical evidence and argue that decisions are affected 
by biases and heuristics that are connected to the context and situation of the 
decision-making.204   
 Cognitive studies and brain science have worked a similar correction in 
contemporary rhetoric’s modern argument theory: the assumptions and premises of 
classical and traditional theories of rhetoric regarding audience have been refined 
by modern social science and cognitive studies that redefine the concept of the 
rhetorical situation in a way that affects every part of persuasive discourse, the 
audience, the message, and the speaker.205  The lessons learned in both 
contemporary law and economics and contemporary rhetoric can inform both 
disciplines to improve theories, predictions, and prescriptions about changes in 
economic analysis of law and legal discourse. 
 Situational decision-making often implicates the different values that people 
assign to different choices depending on the context and situation in which the 
decision is to be made,206 and a rhetorical examination of values leads to the 
                                                 
204 See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, 
supra n.6; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 105-09 (2002). 
 
205 See, e.g., Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; White, Law as Rhetoric, 
supra n.14, at 695; Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra n.17, at 1546; Robbins-Tiscione, 
Rhetoric For Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 9; Makay, Speaking with an Audience, supra n.17, at 9. 
 
206 Mitchell, supra n.209, at 101-10, 160-64; Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of 
Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 & n.24, 614-15, 625-26, 644-45 (2003); Jack L. 
Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, in CHOICES, 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 77 of 83 
 
analysis of pathos207—the emotional response to persuasive discourse208—because 
values appear in contemporary brain science to be the most important trigger of 
emotional conviction.209  Contemporary rhetoric encompasses examination and 
                                                                                                                                                             
VALUES, AND FRAMES 171 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).  See also Amos Tversky & 
Itamar Simonson, Context-dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1179 (1993); Itamar 
Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. 
MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992). 
 
207 Pathos is one of the three artistic topoi of invention, an essential mode of persuasion in classical 
rhetoric.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 99 (Thomas O. Sloan ed., 2001); Robert F. Blomquist, 
Dissent Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 69 MO. L. REV. 
73, 158 (2004).  Quintilian put great stock in emotional appeals, Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal 
Audience, supra n.45, at 91, claiming that, “this emotional power . . . dominates the court [;] it is this 
form of eloquence that is queen of all.” 2 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, supra n.18, at 419.  
Quintilian, like Aristotle, thought that “the duty of the [advocate] is not merely to instruct: the 
power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals.” Id. at 139; see Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal 
Audience, supra n.45, at 91.  Over-reliance on the logos, the logical presentation, of an argument 
may be a myopic tendency of lawyers, but it is likewise clear that pathos cannot be controlled 
directly by legal argument. Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 78. See also Kenneth D. Chestek, 
Judging By the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 1, 3, 5, 29-30 (2010) 
(an empirical study of the persuasiveness of logos-centric vs. pathos-centric briefs).  The classical 
rhetoricians recognized that our emotions are not entirely under the control of our will and our 
intellect.  Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 78.  We cannot use logic to argue an audience into an 
emotional state any more than we can will ourselves into an emotional reaction based on an 
intellectual conviction that we should have a certain emotional reaction to a certain set of facts or a 
particular logical appeal.  See id.  An advocate that explicitly announces that he or she will play on 
the audience’s emotions in the presentation of the discourse will inevitably achieve the opposite 
result; the audience, made wary of emotional manipulation, will at best steel themselves not to be 
manipulated and at worst will discount the advocate’s presentation on the grounds that the advocate 
has engaged in trickery and subterfuge. See id. at 78-79. Thus, the advocate must not openly play 
upon the audience’s heart strings, but instead must carefully and subtly arrange the facts and 
narrative reasoning of the case in conjunction with the logic and legal reasoning of the argument.  
See id.; Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra n.45, at 94; Chestek, supra, at 2, 3, 5, 29-32. 
 
208 See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 55, 57, 59 (1997); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation - Part I: Classical Rhetoric 
and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 92 (1993).  See also EMOTIONS, 
COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR 112 (Carroll E. Izard et al. eds., 1984); Arlie Russell Hochschied, THE 
MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983); Carroll E. Izard, HUMAN 
EMOTIONS (1977). 
 
209 See Antonio R. Damasio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 96-97, 
170-75, 250 (1994) [Damasio, Descartes’ Error]; Antonio R. Damasio, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, 
SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 54 (2003).  See also Robert F. Blomquist, The Pragmatically 
Virtuous Lawyer?, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 93, 114, 133 (2009); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: 
The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381 (2008); 
Stanchi, Science of Persuasion, at 411; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 28; Raymond Ross, 
UNDERSTANDING PERSUASION 7 (3rd ed. 1990).   
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consideration of the values of the audience, as well as their passions and biases, in 
its study of the use of practical reasoning and informal logic, narrative reasoning 
(and its many sub-categories—storytelling, mythical forms, parable forms, hero-
antihero archetypes), and the schemes and tropes of composition in analogical and 
literary forms (e.g., schemes and figures of speech, metaphor theory, and literary 
allusion).210  Contemporary law and economics describes the same type of 
phenomena as biases and heuristics—anchoring, status quo bias, endowment effect 
bias, risk/loss aversion, representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and 
probability assessment dysfunctionality.211 Contemporary rhetoric applies cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                             
     Damasio describes the brain process of somatic marking which is used to evaluate experience of 
the world, tagging certain facts as useful and valuable toward an objective, and rejecting many 
others.  In decision-making, such as the task of jurors, the process involves the somatic marking of 
evidence for its salience toward the decision, winnowing down the possible choices and their 
consequences based on the somatic marker (loosely characterized as a "gut feeling") assigned to the 
evidence. (Contemporary legal economists and behavioral scientists would characterize this as the 
application of affect heuristics.  E.g., Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of 
Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 2 (2000)). Jurors then seek a narrative that 
makes sense fitting the marked evidence into a coherent, lifelike, believable story.  Jurors can supply 
their own narrative, or the advocate can supply a lifelike, believable storyline that fits the facts (and 
assists the client), which emphasizes the need for storytelling as a tool of narrative reasoning in legal 
discourse.  See generally Damasio, Descartes’ Error, supra, at 170-75; Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional 
Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1628, 1631-33 (2007). 
 
210 See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in the Law: Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77 
TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010); Smith, Advanced Legal Writing, supra n.12, at ch. 3; J. Christopher 
Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEG. WRITING 53 (2008); 
Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEG. WRITING 127 (2008); Ruth 
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using the 
Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006); Philip 
N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEG. WRITING 229 (2006); Brian J. Foley & Ruth 
Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write 
Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001); Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the 
Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation To The Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (2001); Linda H. 
Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEG. 
STUD. FORUM 7 (1996). 
 
211 Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1076-78; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra n.5, at 1471-550; Russell 
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in Sunstein, Behavioral 
Law and Economics, supra n.204, at 116-43; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment 
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship : A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499-540 (1998); 
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studies and brain science to inform the predictions of audience reaction and 
motivation produced by the use of certain topics of invention or tropes of style,212 
much in the same way that contemporary law and economics looks to cognitive 
studies and brain science for the same lessons in audience reaction and 
motivation.213 
There are two rhetorical lessons to be drawn from this observation:  first, 
that a single rhetorical approach to discourse may miss the audience and fall short 
of the rhetorical situation.  Discourse should be crafted in layers, and by this I do 
not simply mean the rhetoric-1, -2, or -3 levels pertaining to different audiences, but 
rather the use of multiple layers using different modes of persuasion directed at the 
same audience for the same level of rhetorical communication.  Second, that a 
writer should consider pathos-based modes of persuasion, such as narrative theory 
                                                                                                                                                             
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124, 1128-1130 (1974). 
 
212 For example, the evaluation of the use of metaphor as a method of pathos-based persuasion and 
transmission of meaning has caused rhetoricians to look to social science and cognitive studies to 
study the effects of metaphor in communication.  E.g., Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor, supra n.193, 
at 135-38; Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions 152, 441 (1992); Steven L. 
Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 759 (1992) (reviewing Thomas C. 
Grey, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991)); Burr Henly, 
“Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L. QRTY. 82 (1987); Haig 
Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First 
Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers, 444 J. L. & EDUC. 443 (1986); Edward L. Murray, 
The Phenomenon of the Metaphor: Some Theoretical Considerations, 2 DUQUESNE STUDIES IN 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 288 (A. Giorgi, C. Fischer & E. Murray, eds., 1975); James B. 
White, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 695, 
707 (1973); Owen Barfield, POETIC DICTION: A STUDY IN MEANING 63-64 (1964). 
 
213 Most if not all of the sources on behavioral law and economics indicate a trend toward 
incorporating cognitive studies, and the most cutting edge of these sources point toward new ways of 
understanding incentives and motivation through brain science.  See, e.g., John N. Drobak & 
Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance Of Constraints On 
Non-Rational Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 131 (2008); Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, 
& Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35 (2005); Anne C. Dailey, The 
Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1599 (2000). 
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and storytelling modes to target the values of the audience in the situation and 
present discourse that the audience will identify and accept, perhaps not as the sole 
mode of persuasion, but as one layer in the communication. 
 
Conclusion 
The rhetorical canons of law and economics are tools for legal discourse, not 
universal goals and not perfect solutions.  Law and economics provides a rhetorical 
lens through which a legal author might examine and improve the persuasiveness 
of her discourse.  But a lens like any other tool is only as good as its user.   
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved upon the 
basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of human nature of the ancient 
rhetoricians, but the more complex models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric 
have not replaced the classical rhetorical concept of ethos.  Contemporary rhetoric 
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that confirm the 
importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos and the necessity that 
rhetoric examine the values of the audience in the rhetorical situation so as to 
anticipate the emotional reaction of the audience to the discourse.   Similar lessons 
are being learned in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive 
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate our study of 
motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks to improve the designing of 
incentives in the face of new conceptions of rational choice.  Each discipline can 
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learn lessons from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different 
audiences in different situations. 
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of contemporary 
rhetoric, law and economics.  Efficiency, when used in appropriate ways in 
appropriate rhetorical situations, can improve discourse in style, arrangement, and 
invention.  The expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of 
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of laws and legal policy; its widespread acceptance in 
the law is only further evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many 
areas of the law and many legal situations.  The persuasiveness of mathematics and 
science extends to their forms and the substance of their proofs, and the use of the 
methods and forms may create meaning and inspire imagination that improves 
comprehension and understanding.  The forms of mathematics and science can 
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of the workings of 
the discourse and promoting the opportunity for falsification and rebuttal.    
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not universally 
persuasive.  A topic of invention is a single place to find a method of argumentation, 
not the only place.  Many audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific 
forms especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of fairness 
or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form (elegance, openness, and clarity) 
and in the elimination of costs and waste may be widely persuasive, but other 
economic rhetorical turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best 
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left to rhetoric-1 discourse of economists.  Incentives and costs is a language, and 
many rhetorical situations accept this language, but the general application must 
fit the topic and the situation; simply identifying something as an incentive or a cost 
will not be persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different topos for 
argument or a more apt trope of style.   
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law and 
economics.  Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of contemporary economics 
start with the assertion that mathematical and scientific methods of daunting 
complexity are used to hide the workings of the reasoning, not to promote 
understanding or persuasion.  The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the cudgel, 
used to overpower the audience with coercion not persuasion.  The formula might 
hide the workings of the reasoning rather than openly demonstrate the reasoning 
for falsification or rebuttal, all under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the 
force of such a powerful device.  Charts and diagrammatics may be used to distract 
the audience or trick them into believing a mathematical or scientific analysis was 
performed to produce the assertions made in the rhetoric, when little or no math or 
science was involved.  Quantitative analysis may crunch data whose true meaning 
is buried in the assumptions made that chose what data to collect and what to 
exclude, and in the premises drawn from the assumptions that determined the 
possible conclusions that could be drawn from the experiment or analysis.   
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science, efficiency, incentives 
and costs, and rational choice theory for rhetoric-1 communication with legal 
 Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law  Page 83 of 83 
 
economists, but often uses the same topics and tropes as powerful props in rhetoric-
2 and rhetoric-3 communication with lawmakers and policy-makers—again, rightly 
or wrongly according to the ethos of the speaker and the communication.214  The 
canons of law and economics rhetoric, like the canons of the other schools of 
contemporary rhetoric, may be employed to promote effective communication for the 
purpose of persuasion, or be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse, obfuscate, or 
coerce the audience.  This is a lesson for all rhetoricians, those of law and economics 
and of general legal discourse. 
                                                 
214 My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt comment, “Statistics 
never lie—but liars use statistics.” 
